Social Comparison Theory in the Context of Chronic Illness: Predictors and Consequences of Target Selection among Individuals with Type 2 Diabetes by Arigo, Danielle
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Psychology - Dissertations College of Arts and Sciences 
8-2012 
Social Comparison Theory in the Context of Chronic Illness: 
Predictors and Consequences of Target Selection among 
Individuals with Type 2 Diabetes 
Danielle Arigo 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/psy_etd 
 Part of the Social Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arigo, Danielle, "Social Comparison Theory in the Context of Chronic Illness: Predictors and 
Consequences of Target Selection among Individuals with Type 2 Diabetes" (2012). Psychology - 
Dissertations. 168. 
https://surface.syr.edu/psy_etd/168 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at SURFACE. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Psychology - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more 
information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
  
 
 Abstract 
Individuals often compare themselves to others (i.e., social comparisons) in order to 
determine their status in a given domain. Social comparisons may be particularly important for 
patients with chronic illness; patients often experience uncertainty and anxiety about their health, 
which increase the likelihood and utility of social comparisons. Among patients, social 
comparisons can have both positive and negative health-related consequences (for affect, 
motivation to improve one’s health care behaviors, etc.), depending upon several contextual 
features. Various steps in the social comparison process have been proposed, but not tested 
directly. The present study is an examination of the social comparison process among patients 
with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM) – a condition that is a growing public health concern for 
which psychosocial interventions can be beneficial. Patient participants used a web-mediated 
program to self-report individual difference characteristics prior to selecting from four 
comparison targets (descriptions of other patients with T2DM). Patients then rated their 
motivations for selection, read a description of their chosen patient, and reported on their 
response (e.g., current affect, motivation to improve self-care). Patients who endorsed greater 
symptom severity were more likely to choose sicker comparison targets, but choice was 
unrelated to personality characteristics. A model that incorporated several individual difference 
factors thought to be related to social comparison had moderate predictive value for comparison 
choice. The extent to which patients focused on differences and similarities between themselves 
and their chosen targets moderated affective and motivational response (respectively). These 
findings may contribute to the improvement of psychosocial interventions for patients with 
T2DM and other illnesses (e.g., components of cognitive intervention, educational materials that 
include patient testimonials, the composition of support groups). 
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Social Comparison Theory in the Context of Chronic Illness: 
Predictors and Consequences of Target Selection among Individuals with Type 2 Diabetes 
 A state of good physical and emotional health allows individuals to freely engage in 
desired tasks, which in turn promote independence, well-being, and life satisfaction. The 
presence of health problems, in contrast, can limit both independent functioning and the range of 
goals achievable for the person who is ill. As health status contributes either positively or 
negatively to an individual’s level of autonomy and success in everyday activities, health status 
is often an integral dimension of one’s identity (Reitzes & Mutran, 2006) that generates great 
deal of self-focused attention.  
Examining the ways in which individuals evaluate their health may reveal key processes 
that contribute to health-related decisions (e.g., engaging in self-care behaviors) and health status 
(i.e., severity of illness symptoms). One such process involves evaluation via comparisons 
against accepted standards. In his seminal theoretical outline of the comparison process, 
Festinger (1954) proposed that comparisons are most informative with reference to an 
“objective” standard. In the absence of objective standards, however, individuals can evaluate 
themselves relative to others in their environments. Such social comparisons result in 
perceptions of doing well or poorly, which can impact emotional state, motivation to improve 
one’s standing, and behavior in various domains.  
Empirical evidence illustrates that social comparisons are frequent in daily life, and often 
are made with respect to characteristics such as appearance (Leahey, Crowther, & Mikelson, 
2006), income and achievement (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), and health status (Bogart & 
Helgeson, 2000). The potential affective, motivational, and behavioral consequences of social 
comparisons have a range of implications for physical and psychological health. This is 
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particularly true among clinical populations, which may be more vulnerable to the effects of 
comparisons than the general population.  
Social Comparisons and Health: The Impact of Threat 
Social comparisons occur when individuals receive information about others’ situations, 
which can result from multiple sources. The first is “live” contact with other individuals, 
including direct interaction and passive observation in public spaces. The second is learning 
about others through verbal, visual, or written descriptions. Such information is shared via 
conversations (about others not present), watching television programs or movies, and reading 
newspaper or magazine articles. In these situations, social comparisons can occur as automatic 
responses to unsolicited and encounters with social information (Wood, 1996), and the individual 
does not have the option to select a different person against whom to compare. 
Many individuals also willfully seek out social comparisons (e.g., Somerset, Sharp, & 
Campbell, 2002), however. Comparisons that are self-selected from a range of options may serve 
several purposes, and have prompted theoretical and empirical interest in potential motivations 
for (specific) comparisons. Both Wills (1981) and Taylor and Lobel (1989) proposed that 
comparisons are motivated by the desire to alleviate negative emotions associated with threat. 
Wills (1981) suggested that comparisons serve a self-enhancing function. Threats to self-concept 
raise anxiety and negative affect, which individuals naturally want to resolve; comparisons 
toward less fortunate others allow for individuals to perceive themselves as “doing well,” which 
reduces negative affect and restores confidence. Taylor and Lobel (1989) added that comparisons 
toward more fortunate others also are desirable, as they can provide concrete information about 
ways to improve one’s own situation. These comparisons may replace negative affect (e.g., 
despair) with motivation and hope for improvement.  
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Social comparisons do not always result in positive outcomes, however; some 
comparisons actually serve to strengthen existing negative views of the self and the world (Van 
der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1998). Negative views may perpetuate debilitating conditions 
such as depression (Beck & Alford, 2009) and exacerbate physical health symptoms. It is 
possible that negative outcomes naturally result from certain types of comparison. It is equally 
possible that certain individuals make comparisons that result in negative outcomes (that then 
compromise health), or that specific situations are likely to produce comparisons with negative 
outcomes. Addressing this issue represents an area of research opportunity for improving the 
health and well-being of individuals who use comparisons in their everyday lives.  
The Context of Chronic Illness  
The influence of social comparisons may be especially powerful for individuals whose 
health is threatened, as in the case of chronic illness (Van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1996). 
Illness may challenge an individual’s resources, quality of life, and life expectancy 
(Bennenbroek, Buunk, Van der Zee, & Grol, 2002), often initiating psychological stress, anxiety, 
and uncertainty about one’s future (Stiegelis et al., 2004). These psychological states increase the 
desire for information (Rodríguez-Marín et al., 2000) and should thereby increase the likelihood 
that social comparisons will be used to satisfy this desire (Festinger, 1954).  
Although direct comparisons between patients and healthy controls are scarce, existing 
evidence suggests that patients report more frequent use of comparisons than do healthy 
individuals (Van der Zee, Buunk, DeRuiter, Templaar, VanSonderen, & Sanderman, 1996). The 
literature on social comparisons among patients with chronic illness identifies several potential 
factors that may influence comparison outcomes, including personality characteristics, mood 
state prior to the comparison, and patients’ unique interpretations of a given comparison. At 
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present, however, this limited evidence does not adequately address comparison predictors or 
consequences that may impact patients’ health.  
These gaps in the literature suggest several important “next steps” toward improving our 
understanding of comparison process(es) and outcomes among patients with chronic illness. 
Self-selected comparisons represent a particular area of opportunity because very little work has 
captured this type of comparison among patients. Focusing on comparisons that are selected by 
patients will provide initial indication of: (1) types of social comparisons or specific situations 
(i.e., reasons for choosing certain comparisons) that can lead to positive (versus negative) 
consequences, and/or (2) patients who tend to use comparisons that result in positive (versus 
negative) consequences. This information eventually may inform the design of comparison-
based psychosocial interventions for patients with chronic illness, who are at risk for 
experiencing significant psychological difficulties (e.g., depression) that exacerbate physical 
symptoms (Peveler, Carson, & Rodin, 2002).  
Toward these ends, the following provides a brief overview of social comparison theory 
and reviews noteworthy empirical applications of the theory to patients with chronic illness. The 
method and results of a new study are then described. This study was conducted for the purpose 
of identifying: (1) predictors of comparison selection (e.g., personality characteristics, illness 
variables, reasons for target choice), and (2) response to selection (i.e., affective consequence, 
motivation to change self-care behaviors). Finally, the results of this study are discussed in the 
context of existing literature. 
Relevant Components of Social Comparison Theory 
Several aspects of social comparisons may contribute to their effects on emotional 
response and motivation to achieve a goal. First, the dimension of comparison refers to the 
specific attribute that is compared, such as musical ability or proficiency in a language. 
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Comparisons made on dimensions that are important to the individual are more likely to trigger 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses than are comparisons on dimensions that are 
considered irrelevant. Second is the direction of a comparison. Comparison “targets,” or the 
individuals against whom comparisons are made, may be better off than the self (upward 
comparison), worse off than the self (downward comparison), or the same as the self (lateral 
comparison)1 on a given dimension. Viewing the self as doing well or poorly on a given 
dimension, relative to another individual, can have distinct effects on mood and motivation for 
various behaviors.  
Consider, for example, an individual who learns that his friend can run faster than he can. 
Because the target (friend) is doing better than the individual making the comparison, the 
individual makes an upward comparison. According to Festinger (1954), such a comparison 
should result in perception of the opportunity to improve, confidence in one’s ability to improve 
(as someone else has demonstrated accomplishment in the domain of evaluation), and motivation 
to work harder in order to improve. In contrast, an individual who learns that a friend runs slower 
than he does (i.e., downward comparison) should see himself as doing well, experience 
satisfaction with his own accomplishments, and see no reason to work toward improvement. If 
Festinger was correct about the evaluative consequences of comparisons, then each type of 
comparison should lead to a positive emotional state (i.e., optimism, satisfaction). Subsequent 
tests of Festinger’s predictions, however, revealed that additional steps in the process of social 
comparison may impact resulting (post-comparison) affect, expanding the range of potential 
comparison consequences. 
The Relationship between Comparisons and Affect  
Festinger himself did not focus on the emotional consequences of social comparisons. 
Subsequent researchers suggested that the self-appraisal inherent in comparisons (i.e., seeing 
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oneself as doing relatively well or poorly) may impact one’s immediate affective state (e.g., 
Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). As outlined above, Festinger’s initial predictions seem to 
suggest that social comparisons may confer the benefit of positive affect through either favorable 
self-evaluations (via downward comparisons; Wills, 1981) or increased motivation for and 
confidence in improvement (via upward comparisons; Taylor & Lobel, 1989).  
As indicated, however, the larger body of evidence presents a more complicated picture, 
showing that negative affect can result from both upward and downward comparisons (Buunk, 
Collins, Taylor, VanYperen & Dakoff, 1990, Study 2). Chronic negative affect (e.g., sadness, 
frustration) is associated with high risk for cardiovascular disease (Fogel, 2007), compromised 
immune function (Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002), and a host of other 
physical conditions, making negative affect a frequent and appropriate target of intervention – 
particularly those whose health is already compromised. A small number of studies have shown 
that negative outlook and mood as a personality characteristic (i.e., neuroticism) may be linked 
to the repeated use of negative-outcome comparisons (Buunk, Van der Zee, & VanYpren, 2001). 
Yet these findings give little indication of the pathway from a given comparison to negative 
affect. In addition, the same individuals often report experiencing various combinations of 
comparison direction (upward versus downward) and consequence (positive versus negative 
emotion) (e.g., Fry & Debats, 2003; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The presence of upward and 
downward comparisons that result in both positive and negative emotions for the same individual 
suggests that there is another aspect of comparisons contributing to affective response, which 
may influence motivation to change behavior in a given domain. 
Theoretical work on this topic has offered some clarification by approaching the range of 
affect-related findings from a cognitive framework. This framework suggests that an individual’s 
interpretation of a given comparison will contribute to the affective consequence – specifically, 
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the individual’s perceived similarity to a target. Buunk and Ybema (1997) proposed that when 
exposed to a comparison target, the individual focuses either on similarities or differences 
between the self and the target. Focusing on similarities leads the individual to identify with the 
target. Identification with an upward target tends to trigger optimism for improvement (and 
resulting positive affect), whereas identification with a downward target suggests that a worse-
off condition is possible (if not probable), and inspires negative affect. Focusing on differences, 
however, allows the individual to contrast oneself against the target. Contrast against an upward 
target may lead to perceptions of inferiority (and resulting negative affect), whereas contrast 
against a downward target typically inspires reassurance that the individual is doing well (and 
triggers positive affect). 
In sum, both isolated instances of social comparison and the consistent use of a 
comparison strategy have the potential to impact self-evaluations, motivations to improve in a 
given domain, and affect. Whether the effect of comparisons is generally positive or negative is 
dependent upon dimension, direction, and perceived similarity to the target. Comparisons are 
classified according to target direction: upward toward individuals who are “better off” and 
downward toward individuals who are “worse off” on a given dimension. Upward and 
downward comparisons result in distinct self-evaluations (the self as not doing well or doing 
well, respectively), but each has been associated with consequent positive and negative affect. 
The effects on emotional response and motivation to improve may be influenced by perceived 
similarity to the comparison target, which produces identification or contrast. Patients with 
chronic illness are particularly likely to use health-based social comparisons and respond to these 
comparisons in ways that influence their health. Applications of social comparison theory to 
patients with chronic illness will be considered next. 
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Social Comparisons by Patients with Chronic Illness 
When evaluating their health status, patients often look to others with the same illness to 
determine how their symptoms compare to the symptoms of others (Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, 
Higgins, & Abeles, 2000; Bogart & Helgeson, 2000). Patients have frequent opportunities to 
determine how “well” they are relative to others through contact in treatment centers (Kulik, 
Mahler, & Moore, 1996), support groups (Carmack-Taylor, Kulik, Badr et al., 2007), stories told 
by friends, relatives, and media (Taylor et al., 1993, Study 1), and ordinary social encounters 
(Affleck et al., 2000).  
For a patient with a chronic illness, learning that an acquaintance is surviving with the 
same illness may be a positive or negative experience, depending on the context. Information 
about an acquaintance who is doing well may trigger frustration and despair about one’s own 
(worse-off) condition, or may provide reassurance that one’s own symptoms are not immediately 
life-threatening. Conversely, information about an acquaintance who is doing poorly may trigger 
appreciation for one’s own (better-off) status, or signal that one’s own status is likely to become 
worse (Buunk et al., 1990, Study 1; Wills, 1981). Such distinctions are reflected in further 
classification of “positive outcome” or “negative outcome” directional comparisons. For 
example, a comparison to someone who is better off that leads to positive affect would be a 
“positive-outcome upward comparison” (see Figure 1). The outcome of a comparison is likely 
influenced by the specific health-relevant dimension of comparison and perceived similarity to 
the target patient, in addition to the direction of a comparison. 
Social comparison among chronic illness patients has been examined in samples of 
individuals with cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, Ménière’s disease, Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus [HIV], sickle cell disease, chronic pain and fibromyalgia, diabetes 
mellitus, cardiovascular disease and familial hypercholesterolaemia (premorbid heart disease), 
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and end stage renal failure (kidney disease). Investigations have used a variety of methods to 
assess features of comparisons and a wide range of health-related comparison effects, and each 
method provides different information about the process and outcomes of comparisons among 
patients. These differences, including the representation of specific illness populations, are 
discussed below.  
Wood’s (1996) taxonomy of social comparison research methods is a useful framework 
for describing the differences between approaches. Narration methods rely on self-reported 
occurrence of comparisons in daily life, including global judgments of comparison preference or 
style and recollections of specific comparison situations. Reaction methods use experimental and 
quasi-experimental designs to examine the effects of encountered comparisons, or those that are 
not self-motivated (i.e., occur in response to unsolicited presentation of social information and do 
not allow target choice). Finally, selection methods allow patients to choose from multiple 
comparison targets for the purpose of gathering further information about the chosen target. The 
application of these methods to patients with chronic illness will be considered in turn, with 
particular focus on selection methods.  
Narration Methods: Self-Reported Comparisons among Patients with Chronic Illness 
Narration methods have been used in multiple patient samples, but much of this work has 
been conducted with cancer patients. These studies have assessed various features of general 
comparison style and specific comparison types. For example, need for comparison is a rating of 
individuals’ overall desire for social information, without differentiating the direction, 
dimension, or similarity of the comparison target. Retrospective self-report is used to assess the 
frequency of directional (i.e., upward versus downward) comparisons that have already occurred 
in daily life. Similarly, patients report the frequency and intensity of affective responses; 
frequency and intensity are thus past-oriented, resulting in global judgments of comparison 
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history. As noted, responses to comparisons may be influenced by several features of the 
comparison target or situation, including direction, specific health dimension, and perceived 
similarity to the target.  
Comparison frequency and illness characteristics. Among cancer patients, high need 
for comparison is associated with impaired psychological and physical health. Patients with 
cancer who endorse high need for comparison report more (versus less) severe psychological 
distress (Van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1996) and depressive and illness symptoms 
(Bennenbroek, Buunk, Van der Zee, & Grol, 2002). Patients with cancer who are higher in need 
also recall making downward comparisons more frequently than upward (Van der Zee, Buunk, 
DeRuiter et al., 1996; Van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1996).  
Findings from other patient groups also suggest the predominance of comparing 
downward. Patients with cancer and arthritis report preferences for downward comparisons 
(when offered the alternative of upward comparisons; Blalock, DeVellis, & DeVellis, 1989; 
DeVellis, Holt, Renner, & Blalock, 1990) and retrospectively report making downward 
comparisons more often than upward (when asked about both directions; Buunk et al., 1990; 
DeVellis et al., 1990; Heidrich, 1996; Van der Zee, Buunk, DeRuiter et al., 1996). Cardiac 
patients also record more downward comparisons in daily diaries (when asked about both 
upward and downward; Bogart & Helgeson, 2000). When asked to compare against “other 
individuals with the same illness” (rather than against an identifiable other), patients with cancer 
and  rheumatoid arthritis report that they are doing better than most (i.e., downward relative 
evaluation; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Neugebauer, Katz, & Pasch, 2003; Taylor et al., 1993, 
Study 1; Van der Zee et al., 1996; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).  
The association between need and illness symptoms suggests that comparisons may be 
particularly frequent, and possibly more influential, for patients who have greater physical and 
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psychological distress. This relationship may be the result of three pathways: (1) higher need for 
comparison (and consequent use of comparisons) leads to greater distress and more severe 
symptoms, (2) “sicker” patients tend to want more information about others than do patients who 
have less severe symptoms, or (3) both are true, in that sicker patients want more information 
about others and this information increases, rather than decreases, physical and emotional 
distress. There is thus a need for (quasi)experimental work to determine the nature of this 
relationship, which may assist in designing and targeting interventions that reduce the impact of 
comparisons that negatively effect health.  
Downward comparisons may be more common for individuals who have high need for 
comparison because these patients tend to be more physically or psychologically compromised. 
In the case of (more) severe physical or mental health symptoms, the use of downward 
comparisons may serve a self-enhancing function (e.g., improving mood and reducing anxiety; 
Wills, 1981); these patients may selectively use, search for, or remember downward comparison 
opportunities (see Taylor et al., 1993, Study 1). It is possible that downward comparisons are 
more memorable due to their affective consequence, or that other features of comparisons that 
were not assessed (e.g., dimension, perceived similarity) affect the impact of comparisons that 
differ by direction. 
Dimension of illness-related comparison. Existing evidence demonstrates that there are 
two dimensions of illness-related comparison: illness severity and emotional response/coping 
effectiveness. Schachter’s (1959) early work on affiliation showed that individuals who are 
under threat evaluate not only their circumstances, but also their attempts to cope with difficulty. 
Indeed, inquiries into the attributes on which cardiac rehabilitation patients compare themselves 
revealed that patients most often compare the physical characteristics of their illness (e.g., 
symptom severity, prognosis), but also compare their adjustment, coping, and attitudes toward 
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the illness (Buunk et al., 1990; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993). When asked about dimensions 
separately, cancer patients stated preferences for upward targets, rather than downward targets, 
on the dimension of coping (Bennenbroek et al., 2002; Van der Zee, Oldsma, Buunk, & Bos, 
1998), and downward targets, rather than upward targets, on the dimension of illness severity 
(Bennenbroek et al., 2002). Although the dimension of health-related comparison thus may be an 
important predictor of comparison type or consequences, existing work has rarely differentiated 
comparison targets by dimension. To our knowledge, no prior study has assessed differences in 
affective response to targets that differ by dimension. 
Affective consequences of comparisons among patients. Affective reactions to 
comparisons, or the accumulation thereof, may directly or indirectly impact health. Although 
immediate affective responses to comparisons often are transient, even temporary shifts to 
identifiable mood states (e.g., sadness) can influence medical and psychiatric illness features 
such as symptom detection, perceived efficacy for self-care, and treatment-seeking behavior 
(Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). Across multiple illness samples, positive affect (i.e., a “positive 
outcome”) was more common than negative affect (i.e., a “negative outcome”) following 
comparisons (Affleck et al., 1988; Hemphill & Lehman, 1991; Huang, Gorawara-Bhat, & Chin, 
2005; Lindqvist, Carlsson, & Sjoden, 2000; Senior, Smith, Michie, & Marteau, 2002; Somerset, 
Sharp, & Campbell, 2002; Stanton et al., 1999). This difference was more pronounced for 
downward comparisons than upward comparisons (Bogart & Helgeson, 2000), suggesting that 
downward comparisons are much more often associated with positive than negative affect.  
Similarly, patients with breast cancer and osteoarthritis endorsed positive consequences 
(e.g., “feel good about myself”) of both upward and downward comparisons, and downward 
comparisons were rated as more positive than were upward comparisons (Heidrich, 1996). 
Among cancer patients, most common were positive-outcome downward comparisons (made by 
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82% of patients), followed closely by positive-outcome upward comparisons (made by 78%); 
negative-outcome comparisons were made by less than 60% of patients (Buunk et al., 1990).  
Although such findings are consistent with the notion that patients make comparisons for 
the purpose of self-enhancement (Wills, 1981), the studies noted above do not consider 
important contextual features and do not differentiate comparisons that are self-selected from 
those that result from singular encounters in the environment. It is possible that many patients 
naturally confront opportunities for downward comparison more often than for upward 
comparison. As Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) note, however, not all patients can be doing 
better than most others. It therefore is unlikely that the majority of patients who participate in 
research are those who have few opportunities for upward comparison. This logic suggests that 
(some) patients purposely choose downward targets more often than upward, and that further 
investigation of self-selected comparisons is necessary to understand the affective (and related 
behavioral) consequences of naturally-occurring comparisons. 
What determines whether patients experience positive versus negative comparison 
consequences? It seems clear that comparison direction is not the only determinant of post-
comparison affect. Even in studies that demonstrate the high frequency of downward 
comparisons, there are substantial minority of stated preferences for upward targets (Kulik, 
Moore, & Mahler, 1993) and recalled upward comparisons (Buunk et al., 1990, Study 1; 
Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Hemphill & Lehman, 1991) in a range of patient samples. Several 
studies demonstrate that although many instances of both upward and downward comparison 
result in positive outcomes, negative-outcome comparisons are common and may warrant 
increased attention (Dibb & Yardley, 2006, Study 1; Senior et al., 2002; Somerset et al., 2002; 
Wood et al., 1985). Two potentially related constructs have been offered to account for the 
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existence of both positive- and negative-outcome upward and downward comparisons: perceived 
similarity and neuroticism. 
Perceived similarity. As noted, researchers have invoked “interpretation” frameworks 
such as the Identification/Contrast Model (Buunk & Ybema, 1997) to explain the existence of 
both positive- and negative-outcome comparisons (see Figure 1). This model suggests that 
identification with (or focusing on similarities to) an upward target can result in the realization 
that improvement is possible and a model for how to improve (Taylor & Lobel, 1983). In the 
case of chronic illness, improvement may be reflected in medication adherence or the adoption 
healthy self-care behaviors. Contrast against (or focusing on differences between the self and) a 
downward target emphasizes an individual’s superiority in the health domain, as the individual is 
not as sick as another patient (e.g., “My symptoms aren’t that bad”). Conversely, contrast against 
an upward target likely highlights an individual’s inferiority (e.g., “My health could be much 
better,” “I could do more to take care of myself”), and identification with a downward target 
shows that a situation could become worse (e.g., “I am likely to become as sick as that person”). 
Both upward contrast and downward identification typically result in negative affect (Buunk & 
Ybema, 1997).  
Perceived similarity typically is inferred from outcome, rather than assessed as a unique 
variable, which does not lend empirical support to the Identification/Contrast Model. Only a 
small number of studies have assessed perceived similarity explicitly. In these studies, negative-
outcome comparisons were related to lower adjustment (versus positive-outcome comparisons) 
— regardless of comparison direction. For example, negative-outcome comparisons were 
consistently associated with lower self-ratings of overall health, vitality, and social and 
emotional functioning among patients with Ménière’s disease; the frequency of positive-outcome 
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comparisons was unrelated to self-rated physical and psychological health (Dibb & Yardley, 
2006, Study 2).  
Among patients with cancer, positive-outcome comparisons were associated with 
“action-focused” coping mechanisms (i.e., changing the situation, seeking support, and focusing 
on personal growth), which typically are viewed as effective (Van der Zee et al., 2000). 
Negative-outcome comparisons were associated with more “emotion-focused” methods (i.e., 
expressing emotion, typically considered ineffective) in this study. In the same study, upward 
identification and downward contrast (i.e., “positive-outcome” comparisons) were strongly 
correlated, whereas correlation between downward identification and upward contrast (i.e., 
“negative-outcome” comparisons) was weak. The latter finding indicates that perceived 
similarity may be trait-like, in that some individuals are “self-enhancers” (and tend toward 
upward identification and downward contrast). Yet the lack of a compelling relationship between 
the possible comparison responses of “self-defeaters” (who might tend toward downward 
identification and upward contrast) also leaves open the possibility that perceived similarity is, to 
some extent, flexible and situationally-bound. 
Neuroticism and negative-outcome comparisons. One stable personality trait that has 
been linked to comparison outcome is neuroticism. Studies have shown that cancer patients who 
score high in neuroticism pay more attention to social information than patients low in 
neuroticism (Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos, 1998), and use comparisons in ways that 
support their negative views of the self and increase negative affect (Van der Zee, Buunk, & 
Sanderman, 1998; Van der Zee, Buunk, Sanderman, Botke, & van den Bergh, 2000). Indeed, 
patients who are high (versus low) in neuroticism explicitly endorse greater downward 
identification (Van der Zee et al., 1999). Existing evidence thus points to neuroticism as a 
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potential influence on the affective consequences of comparisons, but this finding requires 
replication in samples of patients with illnesses other than cancer.  
Summary of narration methods. Overall, there is some evidence to suggest that patients 
with severe physical and psychological symptoms are more likely to want opportunities for 
comparison, relative to those with more mild symptoms. This may be due to high anxiety or 
uncertainty about one’s future associated with severe symptoms, and thus “sicker” patients may 
use comparisons to alleviate negative affect. Findings in various patient samples demonstrate 
that downward comparisons are more common than upward (based on recall). 
The affective consequence of a comparison appears dependent on the direction and 
dimension of the comparison, and on perceived similarity to the target. A patient’s general 
comparison style, including direction and perceived similarity, may be associated with 
personality traits such as neuroticism. Despite awareness that each of these features is important 
with respect to consequences, no single study has incorporated all of them in order to examine 
processes that lead to positive- and negative-outcome comparisons. Without consistent 
assessment of contextual features, it is difficult to determine which patients are at risk for 
negative consequences and when positive (versus negative) affective consequences are likely to 
occur. It is important to note that all of these findings are based on patients’ self-reports of 
current preference or prior comparisons; the following section considers comparisons that are 
induced (or elicited by researchers), rather than recalled. The lack of evidence related to 
(motivation for) illness self-care behavior also is an area of opportunity for future work. 
Reaction Methods: Target Presentation to Patients with Chronic Illness 
Experimental and quasi-experimental studies answer the question of “what happens when 
patients are confronted with social information, and are not allowed to choose their comparison 
targets?” Although studies that use reaction methods typically are conducted in research/ 
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laboratory settings, the designs attempt to mimic situations that patients would encounter in their 
everyday lives (e.g., receiving a handout from a specialty clinic that includes information about 
other patients, observing or talking with another patient in a treatment center). The simplest 
designs have compared the opportunity to make a comparison (through the presentation of a 
patient target) against no opportunity to make a comparison. Somewhat more sophisticated 
designs have compared targets that differ by dimension (e.g., physical aspects of the illness, 
emotional response to illness) to one another, and to no target.  
These studies have shown no differential effects of dimension, but demonstrate that 
opportunities for social comparison result in improved emotional and physical health outcomes 
(e.g., less anxiety, shorter inpatient hospital stays), relative to the presentation of health 
information alone (i.e., no target; Mahler & Kulik, 1998; Mahler, Kulik, & Hill, 1995). For 
example, a written psychoeducational booklet that included an upward comparison target led to 
the weakening of associations between perceived control/uncertainty and depression/anger 
(Steigelis et al., 2004). Moreover, cardiovascular surgery patients who viewed videotapes that 
included upward comparison targets experienced fewer post-operative complications and 
increased ambulation post-surgery (Mahler, Kulik, & Hill, 1995), and higher lung function and 
shorter intensive care and overall hospital stays (Mahler & Kulik, 1998), than patients who 
viewed tapes without comparison targets.  
Based on such findings, it is possible that the opportunity for social comparison (versus 
no opportunity for comparison) has medical benefits for patients with chronic illness. As these 
studies included only upward comparison targets, however, they offer little help to clarify the 
broader process of comparison or identify the types of targets that should be used in 
interventions. More complex (quasi)experimental studies provide a bit more detail. For instance, 
cancer patients who listened to audiotapes of targets describing their coping efforts reported 
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higher self-efficacy for coping with cancer, relative to patients who heard targets describe 
negative emotional expression (Bennenbroek et al., 2003). Patients who heard (negative) 
emotional expression also reported higher negative affect (i.e., depression and anger) than 
patients who heard about coping or procedural information, suggesting that a target’s emotional 
expression (as presented) may have short-term negative effects.  
Manipulations of direction and dimension. Experimental manipulations that explore 
the effects of both direction (upward versus downward) and dimension (coping versus illness 
prognosis) have captured differences in affiliative response to a target. Breast cancer patients 
who listened to audiotaped interviews with upward coping targets expressed stronger desire for 
emotional support and information from the target, relative to patients who listened to downward 
coping targets; upward targets did not differ from targets whose coping was “unspecified” 
(Stanton et al., 1999). These results were partially replicated in patients with HIV (Derlega et al., 
2008). In this study, patients who listened to upward prognosis targets reported greater desire for 
emotional support and information, relative to patients who listened to “unspecified” prognosis 
targets, but did not differ from patients who listened to downward prognosis targets. Patients 
who listened to downward coping targets showed less desire for emotional support and 
information from the target relative to patients who listened to upward and unspecified coping 
targets.  
Both Stanton and colleagues (1999) and Derlega and colleagues (2008) demonstrate that 
patients prefer support and information from upward coping targets, relative to downward coping 
targets. These studies also suggest that patients may not want support or information from 
downward targets (on either dimension), but did not address the possibility that downward 
comparisons may be useful for reasons such as self-enhancement. In addition, neither study 
assessed affective or illness-related consequences; it is plausible that patients may want certain 
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targets for specific reasons (e.g., emotional support), but that “unwanted” targets are associated 
with additional positive outcomes that were not captured in these studies. 
The issue of preference versus actual benefit is addressed in a series of studies by Kulik 
and colleagues (Kulik & Mahler, 1987; Kulik, Mahler, & Moore, 1996; Kulik, Moore, & Mahler, 
1993). These studies employed quasi-experimental designs of hospital roommate assignment; 
roommate assignment was based on bed availability (determined by hospital staff), as it would 
be in real-world instances of hospitalization. In each of these studies, patients scheduled for 
cardiovascular surgery were assigned to pre-operative roommates (i.e., lateral or downward 
targets) or post-operative roommates (i.e., upward targets). Although most patients expressed 
preferences for (similarly) pre-operative patients prior to surgery, those whose roommates were 
post-operative reported less anxiety about surgery than did patients whose roommates were pre-
operative. Likewise, patients whose roommates were post-operative showed faster return to 
ambulation and shorter hospital stays than patients whose roommates were pre-operative. 
Summary of reaction methods. Manipulation of one or more features of a comparison 
target has shown that the opportunity for comparison may lead to positive health outcomes, 
relative to no opportunity for comparison. Less clear is the type of comparison most clearly 
associated with positive outcomes, based on direction and specific dimension. Although patients 
report preferences for upward coping and downward illness targets, they actually may receive 
greater health benefits from upward illness targets. A potential issue for external validity is that 
existing designs use separate upward and downward targets to illustrate coping and illness 
dimensions; in reality, patients who are used as targets exist on both dimensions simultaneously, 
and it is likely that patients who make comparisons will have information about both coping and 
illness (i.e., severity, prognosis). Targets who are described on both dimensions may more 
accurately reflect patients’ real-world comparison opportunities. Together with the assessment of 
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perceived similarity, future research that examines direction and dimension will provide more 
nuanced indications of the comparison contexts that result in benefit (e.g., comparison to upward 
coping targets when the focus is on identification). 
Narration and Reaction Methods: Conclusions  
Taken together, it appears that narration and reaction methods generate somewhat 
different conclusions. Discrepancies may be related to the inherent differences between asking 
patients to retrospectively aggregate across many instances of comparison (narration methods) 
and observing their responses to individual targets (reaction methods). Reaction methods present 
individual encounters with comparison information, in that patients cannot choose their targets. 
Findings from reaction studies suggest that upward targets are rated more highly on various 
dimensions of affiliation than are downward targets, and that patients may receive superior 
medical and psychological benefits from upward comparisons (relative to downward).  
Narration methods rely on patient recall, and thus capture comparisons that are both 
encountered (i.e., only one available target) and self-selected (from a range of options). Although 
both situations occur in the real world, failure to differentiate them combines and confuses their 
effects. For example, narration methods show that when asked to recall their use of comparisons 
in daily life, patients report more downward comparisons (relative to upward) and report that 
downward comparisons are most often associated with positive affect. These findings stand in 
contrast to results from studies that use reaction methods, preventing a clear understanding of 
whom patients want as targets (i.e., preference for direction/dimension), why they want certain 
targets (i.e., motivation or reason for preference), and what happens when they make certain 
comparisons (i.e., interpretation of similarity, affective response, medical outcomes/motivation 
to change health behaviors). 
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Examining comparison consequences experimentally via reaction methods isolates the 
“individual target” situation, but ignores self-selected comparisons. The latter provides an 
opportunity to elucidate preference and reason for choosing a particular target, as the choice is 
deliberate, conscious, and recent. It is possible that patients regularly consider multiple available 
targets (or interpretations of the same target), and that they make target selections for predictable 
reasons (e.g., self-enhancement). If patients do consider multiple comparison options, an 
additional complication exists in the typical assessment of “preference.” Ratings of preference 
are entirely hypothetical, in that patients do not have the expectation that their stated preference 
will lead to an actual comparison opportunity. Without this expectation, it is not clear what 
“preference” actually captures, and whether it has any effect on patient outcomes. 
In the absence of an expected comparison opportunity, patients may not carefully attend 
to the potential consequences of each comparison, or prioritize the likely immediate consequence 
in one domain (e.g., affect) over potential longer-term consequences (e.g., motivation to improve 
self-care behaviors). Such cursory consideration of options is less likely when a comparison 
opportunity is expected, and it remains possible that self-reported preferences are inconsistent 
with the actual motivated comparison activity that occurs in patients’ daily lives. In short, 
although we know the range of potential impact of comparisons on affect and motivation for 
healthy behaviors, the process that leads to each consequence is largely unknown. 
Target Selection by Patients with Chronic Illness 
 A small number of studies have addressed the ambiguity of “preference” by 
providing patients with brief descriptions of multiple comparison targets and allowing them to 
select the target(s) about whom they would like to learn more. Preference in selection studies 
(Wood, 1996) is thus based on behaviorally-demonstrated indication of desire for comparison 
information. Targets in existing selection studies are patients with the same illnesses as patient 
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participants, and are described as doing well (upward targets) or poorly (downward targets) on 
the dimension of illness severity. Previous research has not assessed the effects of describing 
target coping, and has ignored many features of the comparison context (e.g., pre-existing affect, 
motivation for selection, perceived similarity to the target). 
Only two available studies have used selection methods to assess preference. The first 
allowed participants with rheumatoid arthritis to select one of two folders; participants were 
asked to choose either a patient “doing better or doing worse than you” (DeVellis et al., 1990, 
p.6). Folders contained a description of a patient who had either “very mild” (upward target) or 
“very severe” (downward target) arthritis symptoms, based on the participant’s choice. In this 
study, patients chose downward targets more often than upward targets. Folder choice was not 
related to global negative affect.  
A second study, conducted in a sample of patients with cancer, allowed participants to 
select from various electronic descriptions of other patients with cancer who were either doing 
well or poorly. Participants were allowed to choose as many descriptions as they liked, and time 
spent reading each choice was monitored by the computer system (Van der Zee et al., 1998). 
Participants in this study spent more time reading about upward targets, relative to reading about 
downward targets. Participants who chose more upward targets also reported higher positive 
affect after terminating the computer program. In contrast, patients who chose more downward 
targets reported higher negative affect after exposure to comparison targets.  
This small set of studies suggests that patients with cancer typically prefer to read about 
upward targets, whereas patients with arthritis prefer to read about downward targets. This 
difference in choice may reflect divergence in the nature of cancer versus arthritis (see Heidrich, 
1996). Cancer prognoses vary widely, but many patients with cancer can foresee potential 
improvement. The possibility of gathering information about how to improve may make upward 
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comparisons useful to these patients in a way that downward comparisons are not, or are less so. 
As arthritis is degenerative, however, patients typically cannot look forward to future 
improvement and may thus be more comforted by downward comparisons. Differences in target 
selection also may be due to a host of other illness- or personality-related aspects of the samples 
that were not the focus of either study, such as illness duration (Affleck, Tennen, Pfeiffer, & 
Fifield, 1988; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). 
Van der Zee et al. (1998) also showed that patients who chose to read about upward 
targets tend to experience consequent positive feelings more so than those who chose to read 
about downward targets. The negative impact of downward comparisons stands in contrast to 
predictions and self-reports that downward comparisons result in satisfaction with one’s own 
standing (and thereby, positive affect), indicating that additional features of the comparison 
context may impact the outcome of targets that are deliberately selected. In particular, because 
there is no indication of pre- to post-selection change in affect, it is possible that preexisting 
mood contributed to target selection (cf. Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). In this case, selection may 
serve to maintain current mood, which could have positive or negative effects on health. 
If choice is repeated over time, consistent engagement in comparison activity that triggers 
negative affect (for example) may have long-term psychological and physical health 
consequences. Alternatively, although the immediate consequences of certain comparisons may 
be negative, the cumulative effect of repeated comparisons may be positive (e.g., appreciation 
for one’s own situation, increased motivation to improve self-care), and may have a positive 
effect on health. As such, results from studies that use selection methods underscore the potential 
impact of social comparisons on the health of patients with chronic illness and highlight the 
importance of gaining further insight into the process of selecting comparison targets. Because 
selection methods have been employed only in samples of cancer and rheumatoid arthritis 
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patients, however, expanding the range of patient samples would address the generalizability of 
existing evidence. 
Summary and Overview of the Present Study 
Applications of social comparison theory in patient samples indicate that comparisons 
can have meaningful affective consequences, and may influence motivation for self-care 
behaviors. The consequence of a given comparison is impacted by several factors, including: (1) 
individual difference characteristics (e.g., neuroticism), (2) target characteristics (i.e., direction 
and dimension), (3) specific reasons for or desired outcomes of a comparison (e.g., feeling better 
about one’s own situation), (4) pre-comparison affect, and (5) comparison interpretation (i.e., 
perceived similarity). Increasing our knowledge of the process of social comparison among 
chronic illness patients eventually may contribute to the improvement of interventions for 
patients with chronic illness. Specifically, understanding what patients are likely to do on their 
own (e.g., talking to other patients, reading patient testimonials on the internet) and the effects of 
comparisons allows providers to consider optimal methods for using comparison information in 
interventions (Arigo, Suls, & Smyth, 2012). In contexts such as patient support groups and the 
presentation of educational materials, for example, patients may be trained to make comparisons 
that lead to positive mood and/or improved motivation for self-care. 
Selection methods provide a unique opportunity to assess each comparison-relevant 
variable in turn, and to determine their unique and/or combined effects on comparison 
consequences. Selection methods are underutilized, however, and have been applied to only a 
limited range of illnesses. An important next step is to conduct selection studies that capture each 
process variable, and ideally, to do so in a way that incorporates new and potentially vulnerable 
patient populations. Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM) is a chronic but preventable heath 
condition that requires consistent maintenance through specific self-care behaviors. Because 
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prognosis for T2DM is highly variable, patients who are diagnosed with this condition likely 
experience high uncertainty about their health status, which may increase the desire for (and/or 
impact) of social comparisons. T2DM is thus an important and appropriate condition in which to 
examine the process and consequences of target selection. 
Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus 
 T2DM is an acquired metabolic disorder characterized by the excessive buildup of 
glucose (sugar) in the blood stream. In healthy individuals, glucose is transported to cells to fuel 
maintenance and growth – a process that requires the assistance of the hormone insulin. T2DM 
results from insulin resistance: cells fail to respond to the release of insulin, and glucose builds 
up in the blood stream and is then eliminated through urine, rather than used by cells (National 
Institutes of Health, 2009). Over time, high levels of blood glucose can lead to a variety of 
symptoms, ranging from mild to severe. Initial, mild symptoms include thirst, dizziness, frequent 
urination, and blurred vision. More serious, longer-term symptoms include neuropathy, 
retinopathy (and often, blindness), and kidney failure, among others.  
Diagnosis of T2DM typically occurs in adulthood (i.e., after the age of 20); the disorder 
is most common among individuals aged 60 or older, suggesting increased prevalence with 
advancing age. Although genetic predisposition (Jonsson et al., 2008) and pathogen exposure 
(Tong et al., 2009) have been implicated in the etiology of T2DM, unhealthy lifestyle choices 
(e.g., diets high in saturated fat, lack of exercise) significantly increase the probability of 
developing the disorder. A diagnosis of T2DM necessitates consistent attention to lifestyle 
choices, in order to prevent an unsafe rise in blood glucose and avoid debilitating symptoms. 
Major risk factors that contribute to both the onset of T2DM and to ongoing symptoms are thus 
(partially) within an individual’s control. Despite increasing awareness of the lifestyle-based 
risks for T2DM, however, the prevalence of the disorder is steadily increasing; approximately 8 
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million Americans currently carry a diagnosis of T2DM, and another 1.6 million new cases are 
reported each year (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007). Recent estimates show 
that US children born in 2000 have at least a 33% chance of developing T2DM during their 
lifetimes; this risk is even higher among certain demographic groups (Narayan, Boyle, 
Thompson, Sorensen, & Williamson, 2003).  
Individuals with T2DM also are at increased risk for comorbid conditions such as 
dyslipidemia (i.e., high cholesterol; Campbell, 2009), cardiovascular disease (Barrett-Connor, 
2003), emotional distress (e.g., depression; Li et al., 2009), and early death (Florkowski, Scott, 
Coope, & Moir, 2001), which increases the health care burden of T2DM (Durden, Alemayehu, 
Bouchard, Chu, & Aagren, 2009). Although the deleterious effects of both T2DM and associated 
disorders can be curtailed through medical management and psychosocial interventions, 
maximally and widely effective interventions do not yet exist (DeCoster & Cummings, 2005). 
T2DM is thus a growing public health concern that requires improved techniques to treat a wide 
range of physical and psychological symptoms.  
Social Comparison among Patients with Diabetes Mellitus 
In the service of creating effective interventions for patients with T2DM, researchers 
have conducted qualitative interviews to capture the experiences and perceptions of patients who 
have been diagnosed with this illness. Such methods have identified social comparison as a self-
initiated strategy that patients use to understand and cope with their illness (Gorawara-Bhat, 
Huang, & Chin, 2008; Huang, Gorawara-Bhat, & Chin, 2005). When asked about their goals, 
T2DM patients noted that downward comparisons toward other patients resulted in satisfaction 
with one’s own health status and increased motivation to seek treatment. These reported 
consequences potentially reflect downward contrast and downward identification, respectively, 
with each leading to “benefit” in a different way. Downward contrast resulted in favorable self-
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evaluations (and possibly reduced negative affect), whereas downward identification resulted in 
increased motivation to improve self care (despite the possibility of an immediate increase in 
negative affect). Upward comparisons were very rarely invoked; those upward comparisons 
generated by T2DM patients resembled upward contrast and resulted in frustration.  
As revealed through semi-structured interviews, social comparisons are common and 
useful for T2DM patients. A drawback of the qualitative methods employed in existing studies is 
the lack of purposeful assessment of the comparison process, which limits the ability to draw 
conclusions regarding motivations and consequences. Relevant analyses of qualitative data also 
do not explicitly address differences in comparison target choices based on dimension. Only two 
other available studies have captured comparisons among patients with diabetes; these studies 
relied on experimental methods to determine the effects of forced exposure to specific targets.  
Reaction studies among diabetes patients. Based on a previous investigation of patients 
with breast cancer (Stanton et al., 1999), Derlega and colleagues (Derlega et al., 2005) exposed 
patients with T2DM to comparison targets that differed by direction and dimension. Prognosis 
and coping were presented as good, poor, or unspecified. Ratings of desire to affiliate with the 
target did not differ based on prognosis, but did differ based on coping effectiveness. Patients 
exposed to “good” (i.e., upward) coping targets reported greater desire for affiliation and 
emotional support from such targets, and liked such targets better, than did patients exposed to 
“poor” coping targets.  
In a separate study, patients with insulin-dependent diabetes (types 1 and 2) showed 
differences in motivation for self-care based on both personality characteristics and the 
comparison target provided (Schokker et al., 2010). For patients exposed to an upward target, 
those with a high promotion focus (i.e., desire to achieve desirable outcomes) were more 
motivated to engage in self-care than patients with a low promotion focus. For patients exposed 
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to a downward target, those with a high prevention focus (i.e., desire to avoid undesirable 
outcomes) were more motivated to engage in self-care than patients with a low prevention focus. 
Self-efficacy qualified this latter finding, as it only applied to patients with high self-efficacy.3 
Derlega and colleagues (2005) and Schokker and colleagues (2010) thus demonstrated 
that there are differential affiliative and motivational responses to targets among patients with 
diabetes. As these studies used reaction methods, these authors captured responses to individual 
(unselected) comparisons only. These studies also did not assess perceived similarity or affective 
consequences of comparisons. Perhaps the most problematic concern regarding external validity 
is the separation of information about coping effectiveness and illness severity. Derlega and 
colleagues (2005) separated coping and illness dimensions between targets; Schokker and 
colleagues (2010) included both dimensions, but the effects of each dimension were not 
examined. In everyday life, patients are likely to encounter information about both aspects of 
targets. The importance and optimal sequential placement of dimensional information remains 
unclear, leaving room for further work to contribute to our understanding of patient comparisons. 
The proposed study represents an attempt to fill in these noticeable gaps in our knowledge of 
patients’ comparison choices and responses, with the ultimate goal of improving patient care by 
addressing patients’ use of comparisons in psychosocial interventions. 
Outline of the Present Study 
The present study utilized computer-mediated assessment and target presentation to 
capture individual differences (e.g., neuroticism, age, disease factors), reasons for target 
selection (e.g., self-enhancement), target choice, interpretation (i.e., perceived similarity), and 
affective and motivational responses to the selected target in a large sample of patients with 
T2DM. A small pilot study was conducted for the purpose of ensuring that case descriptions of 
targets (i.e., patient vignettes) were seen as clearly representing “upward” versus “downward” 
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targets among patients with T2DM. Patients in vignettes were described on both coping and 
illness severity dimensions in order to mimic real-world comparison opportunities. Patients for 
the large-scale study were recruited with the assistance of online media, including general and 
diabetes-specific websites, and were directed to an independent web-based study designed to 
capture each step in the process of target selection. Please refer to Figure 2 for a visual 
representation of the conceptual model.  
A wide range of data were collected in several stages of the experiment, with each stage 
designed to provide unique information.  Participating patients first responded to questions about 
their general affect, diabetes symptoms, illness duration, social comparison tendencies, and 
neuroticism (individual difference predictors of target selection). A second set of questions 
assessed participants’ mood states immediately pre-selection, self-evaluations of coping and 
illness severity, and motivation for engaging in diabetes-specific self-care behaviors (existing 
affect, self-evaluations, and motivation). Patients then received one-sentence descriptions of their 
comparison target options and selected among them (target selection) before rating several 
possible reasons for their selection (reason for selection). Case description vignettes were then 
presented based on target selection, and patients were asked to read/study them. Subsequently, 
patients rated their perceived similarity (interpretation), post-selection affect, and motivation for 
engaging in self-care behaviors (selection consequences). A flowchart of study procedures can 
be found in Figure 3. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research questions for the present study derive from the existing findings of studies that 
used narration, reaction, and selection methods to assess comparisons among patients with 
chronic illness. Much of the existing literature speculates about the interconnections among 
various steps in the process without testing the entirety of these connections directly within 
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persons in a single experiment. Our overall research goal was to determine whether steps in the 
proposed model, which is based on theoretical and empirical work in the area of social 
comparison, operate as previous authors describe them. Specific research questions correspond 
to individual steps in the process of comparison selection for the purpose of associating each step 
with target selection, consequence, or both. 
Research Question #1: To what extent are diabetes-specific illness symptoms and 
concerns, as well as personality characteristics, associated with general social comparison 
tendencies? Existing literature suggests that certain patients are more likely to engage in social 
comparison in daily life. These patients tend to score highly on measures of neuroticism/negative 
affect, and in some studies, these patients report greater illness severity. To our knowledge, 
neuroticism and general tendency toward social comparison (e.g., Social Comparison Orientation 
[SCO]; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) has been examined only among patients with cancer. Based on 
these findings, we expected that SCO is positively correlated with neuroticism, negative affect, 
and illness severity (as captured by symptom report, concern about diabetes, HbA1c level, body 
mass index [BMI]) (Hypothesis 1a).  
Less clear is the relationship between SCO and length of time since T2DM diagnosis, 
positive affect, and self-rating of coping difficulty; we predicted that SCO would be related to 
these factors, but we did not have specific expectations for direction (Hypothesis 1b). Similarly, 
overall tendencies toward upward and downward comparison (versus extent of comparison 
overall) have not been investigated, and prior findings show that both upward and downward 
comparison can be beneficial for well-being. We predicted that upward and downward SCO 
would be associated with the aforementioned illness-related experiences and personality 
characteristics, but we did not have specific expectations for direction (Hypothesis 1c). 
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Research Question #2: What is the frequency distribution of target selection among 
patients with type 2 diabetes? Previous literature has shown variety in comparison preferences 
(reported and demonstrated), but selection has not been demonstrated among patients with 
T2DM. We predicted that patients would select downward illness/upward coping targets most 
often, as these targets should provide both satisfaction with one’s health status and information 
about how to cope with their illness (Hypothesis 2).  
Research Question #3: Are individual difference characteristics – particularly those that 
are associated with social comparison orientation – related to behaviorally-demonstrated target 
selection? Existing evidence suggests that “sicker” patients may be motivated to alleviate their 
anxiety or uncertainty through the use of downward comparisons. We intended to test whether 
specific physical and psychological experiences are associated with target choice, including 
illness symptoms and neuroticism. We predicted that patients who reported more severe (versus 
less severe) illness symptoms would choose downward illness/downward coping targets most 
often (Hypothesis 3a), and that patients who reported more neuroticism (versus less neuroticism) 
would choose downward illness/upward coping targets most often (Hypothesis 3b). We also 
were interested in whether reported tendency toward social comparison (general, upward, and 
downward SCO) was associated with target selection. We expected that SCO would predict 
target selection (Hypothesis 3c), but we did not have specific predictions about the direction of 
this relationship. 
Research Question #4: Do differences in arousal and mood valence prior to target 
selection lead to different choices? There is some existing evidence to suggest that comparisons 
differ based on an individual’s pre-existing mood (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). To our knowledge, 
pre-comparison mood has not yet been examined among chronic illness patients. Because 
patients may use comparisons to either modify or maintain their moods, we did not have specific 
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predictions about the direction of this relationship, nor about the domain(s) of affect that might 
show the effect. We expected to find that affect immediately prior to selection predicts target 
choice, in the domains of stress (Hypotheses 4a), mood valence (Hypotheses 4b), activation 
(Hypotheses 4c), and excitement (Hypotheses 4d). 
Research Question #5: Does a model that includes multiple variables proposed to 
influence comparisons accurately predict target choice? Previous work has identified illness 
severity, negative outlook, pre-existing affect, and tendency toward comparison as associated 
with target selection, but the predictive power of these factors has not been tested. We expected 
that the combination of illness severity (HbA1c, self-rated symptom severity), negative outlook 
(neuroticism, diabetes concerns, negative mood over the past month), affect immediately prior to 
selection, and social comparison orientation (general, upward, and downward) to predict target 
selection with accuracy that is better than chance (Hypothesis 5).  
Research Question #6: Are target selections differentially associated with reported 
reasons for target choice? Several authors, such as Wills (1981), Taylor and Lobel (1989), and 
Buunk and colleagues (1990), have proposed reasons for specific target selections. These reasons 
include improving affect and gaining information about how to improve one’s standing. In 
previous work, differences in reasons for choosing or focusing on specific comparisons referred 
to direction only; the present study allowed for exploration of patients’ reasons based on both 
direction and dimension of comparison. We predicted that the choice of downward 
illness/upward coping targets would be associated with desires for both information (Hypothesis 
6a) and improved mood (Hypothesis 6b). We expected that the choice of upward 
illness/downward coping targets would be associated with the desire for information (Hypothesis 
6c). We also predicted that the choice of downward illness/downward coping targets would be 
associated with the desire for improved mood (Hypothesis 6d). 
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Research Question #7: Do different target selections result in distinct affective 
consequences? Existing evidence suggests that certain comparisons are associated with greater 
improvements in mood than are other comparisons and suggest that affective consequence may 
be more powerful for downward targets. Because it is unclear whether a specific combined 
(coping/illness severity) target results in greater affective response, we tested the differences in 
affective response (pre- to post-selection) based on each target selection. We expected that the 
choice of downward illness/upward coping targets would result in improved mood (i.e., 
(Hypothesis 7a), whereas the choice of upward illness/downward coping targets would result in 
worsened mood (Hypothesis 7b). We predicted that both upward coping/upward illness targets 
(Hypothesis 7c) and downward illness/upward coping targets (Hypothesis 7d) would result in 
improved mood. Given that upward coping and downward illness targets are separately 
associated with positive affect, we predicted that the choice of downward illness/upward coping 
targets would result in greater increases in positive affect than would any other coping target 
(Hypothesis 7e). 
Research Question #8: Do different target selections result in distinct effects on 
motivation for self-care? Tests of social comparison effects on self-care motivation among 
patients with chronic illness are scarce, but existing evidence suggests that effects differ based on 
comparison target. We predicted that the choice of downward illness/upward coping targets 
would result in higher motivation to improve self-care behavior than any of the other available 
targets (Hypothesis 8). 
Research Question #9: What is the relationship between target selection and perceived 
similarity? We intended to investigate whether identification and contrast are associated with 
target selection or consequence in the ways that they have been theoretically implicated. We 
expected patients who selected upward illness/upward coping targets to state that they focused 
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more on similarities between themselves and the target (Hypothesis 9a), and less on differences 
between themselves and the target (Hypothesis 9b), than patients who selected any other target 
Conversely, we expected patients who selected downward illness targets/downward coping 
targets to state that they focused more on differences between themselves and the target 
(Hypothesis 9c), and less on similarities between themselves and the target (Hypothesis 9d), than 
patients who selected any other target.  
Research Question #10: Does perceived similarity moderate the effect of target 
selection on affective consequences or motivation for self-care? If theoretical work is correct, 
target selection alone may not show a direct impact on affect or motivation. Rather, the 
interaction between target selection and perceived similarity to the target should have greater 
predictive power for reported outcomes. We expected to find a significant interaction effect for 
target selection and perceived similarity on affect (Hypothesis 10a) and motivation for self-care 
(Hypothesis 10b). Specifically, that motivation would be higher with greater identification with 
upward targets and for greater contrast against downward targets. 
Method: Pilot Study 
Participants 
All study procedures were approved by Syracuse University’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). A prior study recruited patients with medically-verified T2DM via print and online 
advertisement through the Stress, Health, and Daily Experiences [SHADE] laboratory at 
Syracuse University from 2005 to 2009. Patients who gave their consent to be notified about 
future research projects were contacted via telephone to determine their interest in the present 
pilot study. Patients also were recruited through printed advertisements distributed in the 
community (e.g., public bulletin boards, diabetes supply stores). Patients who expressed interest 
in the study served as pilot participants for the purpose of evaluating study materials (e.g., patient 
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vignettes). Pilot participants (N=22) completed an initial screening and were scheduled for a 1-
hour appointment at the SHADE research center.  
Most participants in the pilot study were Caucasian (71%), married (or living with 
someone as if married; 43%), and earning less than $20,000 per year. Mean age of the sample 
was 54.10 years (SD=9.68). Mean body mass index [BMI] was 34.65 (SD=6.89); this score falls 
in the “obese” category of the World Health Organization’s international classification system 
(WHO, 2000). Mean reported glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c) level (based on last physician 
visit/assessment) was 8.1% (SD=2.01), indicating higher-than-recommended average blood 
glucose over the past 3-6 months. The American Diabetes Association recommends an HbA1c 
level lower than 7% as optimal for minimizing neuropathic and microvascular complications 
from diabetes (American Diabetes Association, 2010). 
Materials and Measures (located in Appendices A and B) 
Demographics. This form included personal information such as age, gender, household 
income, ethnicity, relationship status, self-reported height and weight (for calculation of body 
mass index), and duration of T2DM. 
Self-rating of illness severity and coping effectiveness. Due to a lack of validated, brief 
measures for illness severity and coping effectiveness, short scales were created for the present 
study. Four items were used to assess participants’ perceptions of their own illness severity. 
These items were based on the dimensions captured in existing measures such as the Short-Form 
Health Survey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), the Diabetes Symptom Checklist (Grootenhius, 
Snoek, Heine, & Bouter, 1993), and the Problem Areas in Diabetes scale (Polonsky, 
Anderson, Lohrer, Welch, Jacobson, Aponte, & Schwartz, 1995). Items assessed symptom 
number, frequency, intensity, and extent of interference with daily activities. Each item was rated 
from 1 (“few”/“very mild”) to 5 (“many”/“very severe”) and items were summed to create a total 
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score. The resulting measure had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.87) and showed a 
strong correlation with the Problem Areas in Diabetes scale (r=.60, p=.003). 
An initial set of items corresponding to coping (i.e., management of negative emotional 
response to illness) assessed number of effective strategies, frequency of deliberate coping, 
extent of difficulty managing emotional response, and extent to which emotional response 
interferes with daily activities. These items were based on the dimensions captured in existing 
measures such as the Short-Form Health Survey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992). Each item was 
rated from 1 (“many”/“no difficulty”) to 5 (“none”/“immense difficulty”) and items were 
intended to be summed to create a total score. This total had poor internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α=.32), and only one item showed significant correlation with the total score (“how 
much difficulty have you had managing your emotional response to diabetes?” r=.35, p=.02).  
In addition, participants expressed confusion about these items and gave feedback that 
they should be simplified and/or consolidated. Participants identified “how much difficulty have 
you had managing your emotional response to diabetes?” as the item that most directly tapped 
coping effectiveness. Alone, this item strongly correlated with affect over the past four weeks 
(positive affect: r=-.64, p=.002; negative affect: r=.62, p=.003), whereas the total score for all 
coping items did not (r=.11, p=.35). As a result, the three low-performing items were dropped 
from the study, and self-rated coping effectiveness was operationalized as participants’ ratings of 
how much difficulty they experience with diabetes-related emotion management. Although a 
one-item scale is not ideal, this item appeared to capture the experience in question. The broader 
health perceptions literature includes empirical evidence to show that single items used capture 
global perceptions perform as well as multiple-item measures (e.g., subjective well-being; 
Gardner, Cummings, Dunham & Pierce, 1998) and predict important outcomes (e.g., all cause 
mortality; DeSalvo,  Bloser, Reynolds, He, & Muntner, 2006). Eliminating extraneous items also 
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reduced the total number of questions included in the study – a change that many participants 
requested.  
Target rating scales. Two items were used to assess participants’ perceptions of patient 
illness severity: one item assessed the number of symptoms (from “very few” to “very many”) 
and one item assessed the severity of symptoms (“very mild” to “extremely severe”). Item scores 
for severity were averaged. One item assessed participants’ perceptions of patient coping (“very 
poorly” to “very well”). Two items assessed relative evaluation with respect to illness severity 
and coping: participants were asked to rate their own illness symptoms and coping relative to the 
patient described (from “doing much worse than the patient” to “doing much better than the 
patient”). Finally, patients were asked to report their affective response(s) and thoughts about 
each patient. In addition to quantitative data (analyzed according to the following procedure), 
affective responses and thoughts provided qualitative information to guide vignette revisions. 
Patient descriptions. Vignettes were developed by the investigators and were based on 
patient descriptions used as comparison targets in previous studies (e.g., Derlega et al., 2005). 
Descriptions in these studies consistently use first-person point of view, and typically are limited 
to one paragraph. For coping targets, these paragraphs begin with “my doctor referred me to a 
diabetes specialist. After my diagnosis, I was depressed, and since then” (my emotions have 
stayed the same/been better, indicating present coping). For illness targets, descriptions include 
physical symptoms (mild for upward targets, severe for downward targets) and self-care 
behaviors (diet and exercise self-management for upward targets, medication/insulin shots for 
downward targets). 
In the present study, vignettes used the same general approach as those presented above, 
but each vignette described a patient with T2DM with respect to both illness symptoms and 
coping strategies. Vignettes used first-person language to eliminate any potential influence of 
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target demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age) on selection or outcomes. Descriptions began 
with reference to initial diagnosis and emotional response, followed by details about symptoms 
and self-care. The vignettes were designed to illustrate upward or downward comparison targets 
on each dimension: One patient had few, mild illness symptoms and is coping well (upward 
illness/upward coping); one had many, severe symptoms but is coping well (downward 
illness/upward coping); one had few, mild symptoms but is coping poorly (upward 
illness/downward coping); one had many, severe symptoms and is coping poorly (downward 
illness/downward coping). The final version of the vignettes used in this study appear in 
Appendix B. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in private rooms in front of desktop computers that allowed them 
to control the pace of presented material by clicking mouse buttons. They were asked to 
complete electronic questionnaires related to their demographic information, illness symptoms, 
and social comparison tendencies, and to view electronic descriptions of four different patients 
with T2DM. (At two points during data collection, the order of target presentation was changed 
to minimize order effects.) Subsequent to viewing each patient description, participants provided 
numerical ratings of each patient’s illness severity and ability to cope with symptoms, based on 
descriptions in the vignettes. Participants were also asked to respond to open-ended prompts to 
capture their cognitive and affective responses to each patient description. Participation ended 
with a debriefing session and the invitation for participants to ask questions about the study. 
Participants were paid $15 for their time. 
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Results: Pilot Study 
Evaluation of Test Materials 
Vignettes were evaluated using both absolute and relative standards. The a priori 
absolute cutoff for determining the suitability of each vignette was an average rating of 1 point 
above or below the midpoint of each scale (e.g., cutoff for downward illness severity target was 
set at 4, with a scale midpoint of 3). Average ratings were evaluated after each group of 8 
participants completed the study. Ratings of the initial vignettes failed to meet this cutoff after 
the first two groups completed the study, and the vignettes were adjusted based on participant 
feedback until they met the absolute cutoff. Vignettes also were evaluated using relative 
standards; upward and downward targets were subjected to paired t-tests to establish significant 
differences between target ratings (p set at .05). For the overall sample, ratings of illness severity 
(t[21]=8.00, p<.0001, d=.42) and coping (t[21]=10.19, p<.0001, d=.59) indicated that 
participants saw upward targets as significantly better than downward targets on both 
dimensions. Study vignettes were considered effective and ready for use in the larger study 
protocol once they met both absolute and relative criteria. 
Method 
Recruitment 
Community participants with self-reported physician-diagnosed T2DM were recruited via 
the use of online advertisement, including postings on T2DM support network websites (e.g., 
diabetesdaily.com), craigslist.org, and social networking websites (Twitter.com). Sites such as 
Diabetes Daily and Twitter are (inter)national and thus tapped a wide range of geographic 
locations. Craigslist uses separate sites for each major city and surrounding area; recruitment 
cities in the present study included New York City, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los 
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Angeles, Philadelphia, and Dallas. These cities were chosen to maximize geographic and ethnic 
diversity and the chances of reaching large numbers of individuals with diabetes.  
Individuals with T2DM who met the following criteria were invited to participate; 
advertisements noted that participants would receive $5 to amazon.com and would be entered to 
win a $100 gift certificate to amazone.com. Inclusion criteria required that participants were not 
currently pregnant, that they could read and write comfortably in English, and that they were 
aged 25 or older. T2DM is most often diagnosed in adulthood and the prevalence of T2DM 
increases with advancing age. As such, a minimum age requirement of 25 reduced the likelihood 
of capturing individuals with other types of metabolic disorders (e.g., type 1 diabetes, which is 
often congenital). Participants who did not meet these criteria based on their self-report were 
excluded from analyses.  
Participants 
A total of 282 individuals with T2DM initiated the study. A number of participants 
(n=82) did not complete the study (some of whom stated that it required too much time to 
finish), leaving a sample of 200 completers. Those who completed the study did not differ from 
non-completers in age, years since diagnosis of T2DM, self-rated illness severity, reported HbA1c 
level, or general tendency toward social comparison (Wilks’s λ=.93, F[8,163]=1.55, p=.15; 
individual T-test ps>.05). Most participants who completed the study were Caucasian (87%), 
married (74%), and affluent (51% indicated an annual income greater than $80,000). Just over 
half of the sample of completers was male (55%). The average participant who completed was 
49 years old (SD=10.47), with a BMI of 33.46 (SD=6.63) and an HbA1c level of 7.59% 
(SD=1.75); average time since diabetes diagnosis was 6.24 years (SD=6.82). Please refer to 
Table 1 for further information about participant demographics. Illness and personality 
characteristics for the overall sample can be found in Table 2. 
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Materials and Measures 
Demographics. This form captured reported personal information such as age, gender, 
household income, ethnicity, relationship status, height and weight (for calculation of body mass 
index), and duration of T2DM. 
Self-rating of illness severity and coping. Four items were used to assess participants’ 
perceptions of their own coping and illness severity. Items corresponding to illness severity 
assessed symptom number, frequency, intensity, and extent of interference with daily activities. 
Each item was rated from 1 (few/very mild) to 5 (many/very severe), and items were summed to 
create a total score. The resulting measure had good internal consistency (α=.88), and showed 
positive associations with reported medical status (r=.35; p<.0001) and concerns about diabetes 
(r=.52; p<.0001). One item corresponding to coping assessed the extent of participants’ distress 
related to managing their diabetes. This item was rated from 1 (very well – no distress) to 5 (not 
well at all – very high distress). Higher ratings on this item (more distress in managing diabetes) 
corresponded to greater depressive symptoms (r=.56; p<.0001), greater negative affect over the 
past month (r=.43; p<.0001), and less positive affect over the past month (r=-.52; p<.0001). 
Problem Areas in Diabetes [PAID]. The PAID is a widely used 20-item inventory that 
asks participants to endorse specific domains of concern related to their diabetes (Polonsky, 
Anderson, Lohrer, Welch, Jacobson, Aponte, & Schwartz, 1995). Each item is rated on a scale of 
0 (“not a problem”) to 4 (“serious problem”); the measures generates a total score between 0 and 
20, with higher scores representing greater difficulty with symptom management. Because this 
measure has a substantial “emotional adjustment” component, it is included in the present study 
to provide information about patients’ coping that was not captured with the single-item coping 
rating. The PAID has previously demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .90) 
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and adequate test-retest reliability over a span of two months (Polonsky et al., 1995). In the 
present study, Cronbach’s alpha was equal to .95. 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Information Measure [IN-COM]. This 23-item 
questionnaire assesses the degree to which individuals report engaging in social comparison 
activity, with separate subscales for upward and downward comparisons (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). Items are rated on a scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree. 
Cronbach’s alphas for this measure’s total score have been reported at .78 and .85 across two 
samples, indicating good internal consistency; alphas for subscales have not been reported. 
Alphas for the present sample were .80 (general), .93 (upward), and .92 (downward). 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Brief version [EPQ]. Items corresponding to 
specific personality characteristics (e.g., “Would you call yourself tense or high-strung?” “Do 
you ever feel miserable for no reason?”) are rated from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The full 
24-item measure (Sato, 2005) captures extraversion and neuroticism; in the present study, only 
the 12-item “neuroticism” subscale was used. This measure has shown good internal consistency 
in previous samples of patients with chronic illness (Cronbach’s α = .85; Van der Zee, Buunk, & 
Sanderman, 1996; 1998). In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .93.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]. The PANAS was included to assess 
affect over the past week (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS includes a total of 20 
words. Ten of these words represent positive affect (PA; e.g., excited, proud, strong) and another 
ten represent negative affect (NA; e.g., distressed, guilty, scared). Participants respond on a scale 
of 1 (very slightly/not at all) to 5 (extremely) as indicative of the degree of the specific affect. 
Total scores range from 10 to 50, with higher scores indicating more intense affect. Internal 
consistency is reportedly .86 to .90 for PA, and .84 to .87 for NA, in previous studies. Alphas for 
the present sample were .94 for PA and .93 for NA.  
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Immediate Affect. The time frame of the PANAS can be changed to capture current 
affect, and often is used as a pre-/post- manipulation affect measure. We chose not to use the 
same measure for state and trait affect, however. Administering the same scale on three 
occasions (i.e., over the past week, “right now” prior to selection, and “right now” subsequent to 
selection) in a short amount of time may not accurately capture distinctions in affect, and would 
likely confuse participants. We thus opted to use the circumplex model (Russell, 1980) to assess 
state affect. Participants were asked to rate four aspects of their current affect both before and 
after target selection Arousal was rated from sleepy (1) to highly active (5), and valence was 
rated from very unpleasant (1) to very pleasant (5). Affect was further delineated on continua 
from relaxed (1) stressed (5) and from depressed (1) to excited (5). In statistical tests, these 
dimensional items were used independently. 
Procedure 
Online advertisements recruited individuals aged 25 or older who were previously 
diagnosed with T2DM. Advertisements referred interested patients to the study’s website 
(diabetes.syr.edu). After providing electronic informed consent, participants were asked to 
complete questionnaires assessing current affect, social comparison tendencies, general and 
diabetes-specific physical functioning, and self-evaluations of their illness severity and ability to 
cope with T2DM. Comparison target options were then presented in a list. Participants read brief 
descriptions of their options (e.g., “Patient X is struggling with severe symptoms of diabetes”) 
and selected one target using the computer mouse. Participants were asked to electronically rate 
potential motivations for selecting their comparison targets. Please refer to Figure 2 for an 
overview of study procedures. 
Upon completion of the motivation rating form, participants had the opportunity to read a 
patient vignette corresponding to their target choice (please refer to Appendix B). Participants 
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were then asked to rate (1) their current affect, (2) the degree to which they focused on various 
aspects of the comparison target (e.g., similarities to the self), and (3) their current level of 
motivation for various self-care behaviors. Finally, participants were invited to email 
su.diabetes@gmail.com to submit their contact information (for the $5 amazon.com gift 
certificate) and to enter the $100 amazon.com gift certificate lottery. 
Results 
Data Security and Cleaning 
Data were collected through a web-based survey system that provides encryption of all 
data files and daily security scans via multiple independent companies. Access to data files 
requires login by the account administrator (investigator); files are password-protected and were 
only accessed by the administrator. Data files were saved to a designated Syracuse University 
computer that is also password-protected to prevent access from unauthorized users.  
As disease status was not confirmed by a physician, we employed a conservative 
approach to inclusion in data analysis. In addition to requiring that respondents reported a 
physician diagnosis of T2DM, those who did not report glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c) levels and 
those who reported levels out of a plausible range (i.e., below 2% and above 20%) were not 
included in analyses.  HbA1c readings reflect the average level of blood glucose over a period of 
2-4 months. Patients with diabetes who are engaged in treatment are likely to know (or have 
access to) their most recent readings, as HbA1c is the most commonly-used marker of glucose 
regulation (and thereby, illness severity). We reasoned that respondents who do not know their 
most recent HbA1c levels likely fall into two categories: individuals who have not been diagnosed 
with T2DM by a physician, or individuals with a diagnosis who are not informed about diabetes 
management. The former category includes individuals who do not meet eligibility criteria; 
individuals in the latter category may be unfamiliar with the symptoms and self-care behaviors 
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described in this study, and therefore may see diabetes comparison targets as irrelevant. These 
individuals (n=20) were outside of our target population and were thus removed from the data set 
prior to hypothesis testing. 
Power Analysis  
Features of the existing relevant literature precluded confident estimation effect sizes for 
the outcomes of interest in this study. First, there is a paucity of extant data using similar 
selection methods of assessment. As the few studies that allowed for participant selection did not 
attempt to predict selection, no available data can inform effect size estimation for this outcome. 
One study provides evidence that could inform an effect size for target choice, but choice was 
based solely on difference in direction; in the present study, the target options varied by direction 
and dimension. With respect to affective response, a crude judgment of effect size can be 
generated from findings associated with multiple methods of assessment. Such findings result 
from analysis of group differences, rather than changes in pre- to post-comparison affect.  
Taken together, extant findings suggest that the effects of individual differences on target 
selection, and of target selection on affect, are likely to be small to moderate (i.e., Cohen’s d of 
0.2 to 0.4; Cohen, 1988). In the case of a small effect size (with up to three predictor variables), a 
sample size of 100 patients would result in adequate power to detect the effect of tests proposed 
for this study (e.g., ANOVA). As multiple tests were performed and multiple predictors were 
used, however, data collection for the present study remained open for 1.5 years in order to 
maximize sample size. Based on a the SAS PROC POWER calculation, the resulting sample size 
(N=180 included in analyses) allowed for enough power to detect a small effect (i.e., d=0.2, 
power>.80).  
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Missing Data 
 As noted, individuals who did not complete the study were eliminated from analyses. 
Responses for those who completed the study were examined to determine the extent and nature 
of missing data. We assumed that data would be missing due to participants randomly 
overlooking items or technical errors (e.g., mouse click did not highlight item response). Overall, 
less than 5% of data were missing, and there was no discernible pattern to missing data. There 
were no participants whose individual set of responses were missing more than 5% of data 
points. As a result, no participants were excluded due to missing data, and missing data was 
considered random. 
Data Analytic Approach 
All analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software (SAS Institute, 2003). 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (between pairs of scores for social comparison, 
well-being, and illness experiences) are presented prior to the results of inferential hypothesis 
tests. Existing literature on social comparisons among patients with chronic illness allows for 
specific predictions about each of the performance of several (but not all) of the variables 
included in the present study. Given that much of the previous literature is theoretical, rather than 
empirical, however, the present study includes novel methods for operationalizing these 
variables and testing their effects. The particular research design used in this study also has not 
been applied to a diabetes population. Consequently, we chose to include multiple approaches to 
answer our research questions, when appropriate. For example, Research Questions 5 includes 
both between-group and within-group analytic approaches to explore related (though distinct) 
hypotheses. Differences between hypotheses and statistical tests are described, with their results. 
The following section presents several pieces of information related to each research 
question. Under each question, we review the method for capturing relevant variables and 
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present descriptive information about these variables. We then outline hypotheses related to the 
research question, the corresponding analytic technique for each hypothesis, and the results of 
each test. Cutoff P-values for statistical significance was set to .05 for all tests. Each section 
concludes with a summary of findings for the associated research question. 
Research Question #1: To what extent are diabetes-specific illness symptoms and concerns, as 
well as personality characteristics, associated with general social comparison tendencies? 
Associations between social comparison orientation and illness/personality characteristics were 
tested with bivariate correlations (Pearson’s r) on total scores for measures of each construct. 
Please refer to Table 2 for baseline descriptive statistics on the overall sample; correlations (r-
values) and individual significance levels for bivariate correlations can be found in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 1a: At baseline, self-rated illness severity, reported HbA1c, diabetes concerns, 
neuroticism, negative affect, and body mass index will be positively correlated with general 
social comparison orientation (SCO).  
This hypothesis was partially supported. Diabetes concerns, neuroticism, and negative 
affect showed significant positive correlations with general SCO (ps<.05), indicating that those 
patients who endorsed high levels of diabetes concerns, neuroticism, and negative affect also 
endorsed strong tendencies toward social comparison. Self-rated illness severity, reported HbA1c, 
and BMI were not related to general SCO (ps>.05).  
Hypothesis 1b: Self-rated coping difficulty, time since diagnosis, and positive affect will 
be correlated with general SCO. 
This hypothesis was supported. Self-rated coping difficulty was positively correlated with 
general SCO (p<.0001), whereas time since diagnosis and positive affect were negatively 
correlated with SCO (ps<.0001). Those patients who reported fewer years since their diagnosis, 
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less positive affect, and more difficulty coping with their diabetes also reported strong tendencies 
toward social comparison. 
Hypothesis 1c: Both upward and downward comparison orientation will be related to 
diabetes experiences and personality characteristics. 
Upward comparison was positively correlated with self-rated illness severity, reported 
HbA1c, difficulty coping with diabetes, diabetes concerns, neuroticism, and negative affect, and 
was negatively correlated with years since diagnosis, BMI, and positive affect (ps<.03). These 
correlations indicate that patients who reported severe physical and emotional diabetes-related 
problems and lower well-being, those who were recently diagnosed, and those with low BMIs 
endorsed strong tendencies toward upward comparison.  
Similarly, downward comparison was positively correlated with self-rated illness 
severity, reported HbA1c, difficulty coping with diabetes, and was negatively correlated with 
years since diagnosis, BMI, and positive affect (ps<.01). Patients who reported severe physical 
diabetes symptoms and difficulty coping with diabetes, those who were recently diagnosed, and 
those with low BMIs endorsed strong tendencies toward downward comparison. Downward 
comparison was unrelated to diabetes concerns, neuroticism, and negative affect. 
Summary of findings for Research Question #1. Reports of general tendency toward 
social comparison are associated with endorsements of greater emotional distress (please refer to 
Table 3). Tendency toward upward comparison (specifically) is associated with both physical 
and emotional distress across multiple domains, including illness severity markers and positive 
and negative affect. Tendency toward downward comparison (specifically) is associated only 
with illness severity markers and (less) positive affect. Patients who were diagnosed in the recent 
(versus distant) past and those who have low (versus high) BMIs appear to have stronger 
tendencies toward social comparison. 
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Research Question #2: What is the frequency distribution of target selection among patients 
with type 2 diabetes? Subsequent to completing baseline measures, participants were provided 
with brief descriptions of the four available target patients and were asked to choose which 
patient to read about. For example, participants read the description “a patient who has severe 
symptoms and is coping well” as a representation of the downward illness/upward coping target 
choice.  
Hypothesis 2: A greater proportion of patients will choose upward coping/downward 
illness targets, relative to other targets.  
Individual differences in target selection were evaluated by a Chi-square test of 
frequency, which showed significant differences in target selection across the sample (χ2=65.80, 
p<.001). The target selected most often was not the expected target (downward illness/upward 
coping), however.  The greatest number of participants selected upward illness/upward coping 
targets (44% of the sample). The downward illness/upward coping target was selected by 34% of 
the sample; upward illness/downward coping and downward illness/downward coping targets 
received 13% and 9% of selections, respectively. 
Summary of findings for Research Question #2. Patients demonstrate significant 
differences in target preference. In the present sample, the largest subset of patients chose to read 
about upward illness/upward coping targets. Our specific hypothesis related to the frequency of 
target selection was not supported. 
Research Question #3: Are individual difference characteristics – particularly those that are 
associated with social comparison orientation – related to behaviorally-demonstrated target 
selection? This question relates to whether different “kinds” of people (indicated by individual 
difference variables) reliably tend toward making particular selections. For example, do patients 
who are sicker (versus less sick) or more (versus less) neurotic make different target choices? In 
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addition, do patients who endorse strong (versus weak) tendencies toward social comparison 
make different target choices? As noted, participants were asked to choose from one of four brief 
descriptions of patients (e.g., “a patient who has severe symptoms and is coping well”).  
Differences in reported illness severity and personality by target selection were examined 
using a generalized logit model (using SAS PROC GENMOD) for each unique predictor. Our 
specific predictions concerned individuals who chose downward illness/downward coping 
targets. As outlined below, these patients were predicted to be worse off than those who chose 
other targets. As the largest number of patients in our sample chose upward illness/upward 
coping targets (and, theoretically, these patients might be the best off in the sample), the upward 
illness/upward coping target group was used as a referent for logistic regression models. Mean 
values for each variable by target selection group can be found in Table 4. A summary of 
regression coefficients, Wald Chi-square tests, and corresponding 95% confidence intervals can 
be found in Table 5.  
Hypothesis 3a: Patients who report more severe (versus less severe) illness symptoms 
will choose downward coping/downward illness targets most often.  
Illness severity was captured in self-reported severity of symptoms, reported HbA1c, and 
BMI. A generalized logit model revealed that reported severity (χ2=9.23, p=.02) and reported 
HbA1c (χ2=10.24, p=.005) significantly predicted target choice, whereas BMI did not (χ2=.25, 
p=.62). Coefficients for both severity of symptoms and reported HbA1c were positive, suggesting 
that these illness markers were higher (i.e., more severe) among patients who did not choose 
upward illness/upward coping targets. Mean scores for target selection groups show that 
symptom severity and HbA1c were highest among patients who chose downward 
illness/downward coping targets. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Patients who report more (versus less) neuroticism will choose downward 
coping/downward illness targets most often.  
Level of neuroticism did not predict target selection (χ2=.03, p=.87), in contrast to 
predictions.  
Hypothesis 3b: Patients who report stronger social comparison orientation (SCO) will 
choose different targets than patients with weaker reported SCO.  
None of the three domains of SCO was related to target selection (general, upward, and 
downward; ps>.05). 
Summary of findings for Research Question #3. Our hypothesis was only partially 
supported: reported symptom severity and aggregated blood glucose significantly predicted 
target selection, in that individuals who reported greater (versus less) symptom severity and 
higher (versus lower) HbA1c levels chose downward illness/downward coping targets. Body mass 
index, level of neuroticism, and social comparison orientation did not predict target selection 
(see Tables 4 and 5). 
Research Question #4: Do differences in arousal and mood valence prior to target 
selection lead to different choices? This question addresses whether individuals who were in 
“better” (e.g., more pleasant, less anxious) moods just before target selection made different 
choices than individuals who were in “worse” (e.g., less pleasant, more anxious) moods. As 
above, differences in affect by target selection were examined using a generalized logit model 
(using SAS PROC GENMOD) for each affect domain, and the upward illness/upward coping 
target group was used as the referent. We did not have specific predictions about the relationship 
between the degree of each affect domain (e.g., higher versus lower stress) and target choice.  A 
summary of regression coefficients, Wald Chi-square tests, and corresponding 95% confidence 
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intervals can be found in Table 5. Mean values for each variable by target selection group can be 
found in Table 6.  
Hypothesis 4a (exploratory). Patients who report higher stress prior to selection will 
choose different targets than patients who report less stress. 
Pre-selection stress level was marginally associated with target choice (χ2=3.02, p=.08). 
The coefficient for pre-selection stress was positive, suggesting that stress was somewhat higher 
among patients who did not choose upward illness/upward coping targets. Mean scores for target 
selection groups show that patients who were more stressed were more likely to select downward 
illness/downward coping targets. 
Hypothesis 4b (exploratory). Patients who report higher (better) mood valence prior to 
selection will choose different targets than patients who report lower (worse) mood valence. 
Pre-selection mood valence was not associated with target choice (χ2=2.19, p=.14). 
Hypothesis 4c (exploratory). Patients who report greater activation prior to selection will 
choose different targets than patients who report lower activation. 
Pre-selection activation was not associated with target choice (χ2=.49, p=.48). 
Hypothesis 4d (exploratory). Patients who report greater excitement prior to selection 
will choose different targets than patients who report less excitement. 
Pre-selection excitement was not associated with target choice (χ2=.01, p=.93). 
Summary of findings for Research Question #4: Contrary to hypotheses, pre-selection 
affect did not reliably differ between target selection groups (see Table 4). A weak exception to 
this was that differences in pre-selection stress level showed a trend toward significance, such 
that patients who reported higher stress prior to selection were those who chose downward 
targets (on either dimension). 
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Research Question #5: Does a model that includes multiple variables proposed to influence 
comparisons accurately predict target choice? In Research Questions 3 and 4, we examined the 
predictive power of specific variables that often have been associated with social comparisons 
(via retrospective recall or target selection) in existing literature. Tests of specific variables 
describe baseline differences between target selection groups. We also wanted to test the 
predictive power and accuracy of a model that includes multiple variables thought to impact 
comparisons. The proposed model included illness severity (HbA1c, self-rated symptom severity), 
negative outlook (neuroticism, diabetes concerns, negative mood over the past week), affect 
immediately prior to selection, and social comparison orientation (general, upward, and 
downward).  
This model was tested using a discriminant function analysis (DFA). DFA produces three 
sets of information that relate to the predictive power of a model. First, it determines how many 
distinct (discriminant) combinations of predictors are associated with a categorical outcome. In 
this way, it is akin to factor analysis in that it groups items (in this case, predictor variables) that 
“hang together,” and provides an estimate of each group’s predictive ability. Second, it gives an 
estimate of the effect size for the model (i.e., amount of variance accounted for; R2). Third, it 
shows the accuracy of the model for predicting membership in each outcome group. We will 
examine each of these aspects of our proposed model, in turn. We did not have expectations 
about the number of discriminant functions or effect size. Our specific concerned the accuracy of 
the model, as outlined below.  
Number of discriminant functions and effect size (exploratory). DFA showed that three 
discriminant functions were calculated, with a combined F(24,484)=1.81 (p=.01). After removal 
of the first function, the association between groups and predictors was no longer significant 
(F[16,334]=.90, p=.56 and F[7,168]=.79, p=.58). These functions did not include information 
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useful for predicting target selection. The first function accounted for 16% of the total 
relationship between predictors and groups, and 59% of the variability between target selection 
groups. 
Hypothesis 5: The proposed model will predict target selection with accuracy that is 
better than chance.  
The identified discriminant function accurately classified 56% of cases in the sample 
(100 correctly classified cases out of 179), compared to 26% (47 correctly classified) due to 
chance alone. Please refer to Table 7 for the number of cases accurately classified by the model.  
Summary of findings for Research Question #5: A model that includes illness severity 
(HbA1c, self-rated symptom severity), negative outlook (neuroticism, diabetes concerns, negative 
mood over the past month), affect immediately prior to selection, and social comparison 
orientation (general, upward, and downward) showed adequate model fit and 56% accuracy for 
predicting target selection (from amongst the four possible targets). Accuracy was much greater 
than chance, and the model accounted for a substantial proportion of the variability between 
groups. 
Research Question #6: Are target selections differentially associated with reported reasons for 
target choice? Immediately after making a target selection, participants were asked to rate five 
separate reasons for making their choice. Reasons were derived from theoretically proposed 
motivations for social comparisons (e.g., Wills, 1981). These included: (1) gaining information 
about how to improve one’s situation, (2) feeling better about one’s own situation, (3) learning 
that others have similar situations to one’s own, (4) boosting confidence in one’s ability to 
improve, and (5) confirming that one’s situation is bad. Reasons were rated prior to reading 
about the chosen target in order to prevent conflation between response to the target and pre-
comparison motivations for selection. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for reason ratings by 
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target selection group; these ratings are graphically depicted in Figure 4. F- and p-values for 
individual contrasts can be found in Table 9. 
Differences in reasons for selection were explored in two ways. First, within-person 
analyses examined the differences in ratings for all reasons within each selection group (within-
group ANOVA). This approach answers the question “do ratings for individual reasons differ 
among individuals who selected a particular target?” Second, between-person analyses allowed 
for tests of differences across selection groups in ratings for individual reasons (between-groups 
ANOVA). This approach answers the question “do ratings for specific reasons differ between 
target selection groups?” 
Hypothesis 6a.1 (within-group): The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets 
will be positively associated with desire for information about how to improve one’s situation, 
(versus other reasons for target selection). 
The desire for information about how to improve as a reason for choosing a target was 
endorsed more strongly than the desires to: (1) confirm that one’s situation is bad, and (2) feel 
better about one’s own situation (ps<.01). Difference in ratings for the desire for information 
about how to improve and learning that another patient’s situation is similar to one’s own was 
marginal (p=.05). The desires for information about how to improve and to boosting confidence 
in one’s ability to improve were not significantly different (p=.29). 
Hypothesis 6a.2 (between-group): The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets 
will be positively associated with desire for information about how to improve one’s situation, 
(versus other target selections). 
Ratings of the desire for information about how to improve were not higher for patients 
who chose downward illness/upward coping targets, relative to other targets (F[1]=1.05, p=.30). 
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Summary of findings for Hypothesis 6a: Patients who chose downward illness/upward 
coping targets reported making this choice to gain information about how to improve, rather than 
for affective or affiliative reasons. Gaining confidence in one’s ability to improve also was rated 
highly. Gaining information about how to improve was not more strongly endorsed by patients 
who chose downward illness/upward coping targets, relative to ratings by patients who chose 
other targets. 
Hypothesis 6b.1: The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets will be 
positively associated with desire to improve mood (versus other reasons for target selection). 
In line with predictions, desire to feel better about one’s own situation was endorsed 
more strongly than the desire to confirm that one’s situation is bad (p<.001). In contrast to 
predictions, however, the desire to feel better about one’s own situation was endorsed less 
strongly than the desires to: (1) boost confidence in one’s ability to improve, (2) gain information 
about how to improve, and (3) learn that another patient’s situation is similar to one’s own 
(ps<.01).  
Hypothesis 6b.2: The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets (versus other 
targets) will be positively associated with desire to improve mood. 
A planned contrast showed that feeling better about one’s own situation was not more 
strongly endorsed by participants who chose downward illness/upward coping targets, relative to 
other targets (F[1]=1.16, p=.28). 
Summary of findings for Hypothesis 6b. Patients who chose downward illness/upward 
coping targets reported making this choice to feel better about their own situations, rather than to 
confirm that their situations are bad (see Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 4). Unexpectedly, boosting 
confidence in their ability to improve, learning that another patient’s situation is similar to their 
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own, and gaining information about how to do so were patients’ top reasons for choosing 
downward illness/upward coping targets.  
Hypothesis 6c.1: The choice of downward illness/downward coping targets will be 
associated with the desire to improve mood (versus other reasons for target selection). 
Contrary to predictions, the desire to feel better about one’s own situation was not 
endorsed more strongly than other reasons for target choice (ps>.10).  
Hypothesis 6c.2: The choice of downward illness/downward coping targets will be 
associated with the desire to improve mood (versus other selections). 
There was no observed difference in ratings for desire to improve mood between patients 
who chose downward illness/downward coping targets and other targets (p=.38). 
Summary of findings for Hypothesis 6c: Patients who chose downward illness/ 
downward coping targets did not show significant distinctions between reasons for target choice. 
Their ratings for reasons also did not differ from those of other target selection groups. 
Summary of findings for Research Question #6. This hypothesis was partially 
supported. Patients who chose downward illness/upward coping targets endorsed gaining 
information about how to improve, boosting confidence in their ability to improve, and learning 
that others have similar situations as the primary reasons for their choice. Neither confirming that 
their situations are bad nor feeling better about their own situations were rated as important 
reasons for this choice. Patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets did not 
endorse specific reasons more strongly than other reasons. 
Research Question #7: Do different target selections result in distinct affective consequences? 
Just before and just after reading about their chosen targets, participants were asked to rate their 
mood on four separate dimensions: arousal, valence (pleasantness), stress, and excitement. 
Affect change on each of these dimensions was calculated by subtracting pre-comparison affect 
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ratings from post-comparison affect ratings, indicating that affect improved or worsened from 
pre- to post-comparison. Descriptive statistics for affect change by target selection group can be 
found in Table 6. 
We again examined the impact of comparisons in two ways. Within-group analyses 
examined affect change among participants who chose a particular target (dependent groups t-
tests on post-pre-comparison affect). These tests answer the question, “did reading about target X 
lead to meaningful affect change from pre- to post-comparison?” (as in Hypotheses 7a-7d) 
Between-group analyses allowed for tests of differences in the amount of affect change across 
selection groups (ANOVA). These tests answer the question, “did the amount of affect change 
differ between groups who chose different targets?” (as in Hypothesis 7e). Although we had 
specific directional predictions, we were unsure which dimensions of affect might reflect the 
expected changes. Please refer to Figure 5 for graphical depiction of affect change.  
Hypothesis 7a: The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets will result in 
improved mood from pre- to post-comparison.  
Dependent groups (paired) t-tests showed that changes in stress, mood valence, 
activation, and excitement were not significant (ps>.05).  
Hypothesis 7b: The choice of upward illness/downward coping targets will result in 
worsened mood.  
Contrary to predictions, patients who chose upward illness/downward coping targets 
showed no significant change in stress, mood, activation, or excitement from pre-comparison to 
post-comparison (ps>.05).  
Hypothesis 7c: The choice of upward coping/upward illness targets will result in 
improved mood.  
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Patients who chose upward illness/upward coping targets reported more pleasant mood 
from pre- to post-comparison. (t[79]=2.12, p=.037). Changes in excitement, stress, and 
activation were not significant (ps>.05).   
Hypothesis 7d: The choice of downward illness/downward coping targets will result in 
improved mood.  
Contrary to predictions, patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets 
showed no significant change in stress, mood, activation, or excitement from pre-comparison to 
post-comparison (ps>.05).  
Hypothesis 7e: The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets will result in 
greater increases in mood ratings than any other target.  
Changes in mood were not greater for patients who chose downward illness/upward 
coping targets, relative to patients who chose other targets (F[1]=.44, p=.51).  
Hypothesis 7f (post-hoc): The pattern of ratings for mood change showed that all target 
selections resulted in improved mood except downward illness/downward coping targets; 
choosing a downward illness/downward coping target resulted in worsened mood. We examined 
whether this difference in mood ratings was significant (downward illness/downward coping 
targets versus all other targets). This difference was significant (F[1]=4.32, p=.039). 
Summary of findings for Research Question #7: Selection of upward illness/upward 
coping targets led to improvement in mood valence (pleasantness). The selection of other targets 
did not result in significant affect changes. Change in valence for participants who chose 
downward illness/downward coping targets was distinct from the improvements observed for 
other targets. 
Research Question #8: Do different target selections result in distinct effects on motivation for 
self-care? Before and after reading about their selected targets, participants were asked to rate 
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their motivation for four diabetes-related self-care behaviors: following recommended diet plans, 
exercising, testing glucose, and taking medications. These behaviors were considered separately 
and aggregated to form a total motivation score. Change in motivation was calculated by 
subtracting pre-comparison ratings from post-comparison ratings, indicating that motivation 
increased or decreased from pre- to post-comparison.  
For descriptive purposes, we present the amount of change in motivation for each self-
care behavior and total motivation for each target selection group (see Table 6). Only between-
groups analyses were appropriate for our hypotheses. Between-groups analyses allowed for tests 
of differences in the amount of motivation change across selection groups (ANOVA). These tests 
answer the question, “did the amount of motivation change differ between groups who chose 
different targets?” Please refer to Figure 6 for graphical depiction of motivation change.  
Hypothesis 8(a): The choice of downward illness/upward coping targets will result in 
greater improvement in motivation for self-care behavior than any other target.  
Neither change in motivation for specific behaviors (ps>.10) nor overall change in 
motivation for self-care (total score; F[1]=.01, p=.92) differed between patients who chose 
downward illness/upward coping targets and those who chose other targets. 
Hypothesis 8b (post-hoc): The pattern of ratings for motivation change showed that the 
selection of downward illness/downward coping targets resulted in noticeably large 
improvement. The difference in motivation change between patients who chose upward 
illness/downward coping targets and those who chose other targets was not significant (F[1]=.98, 
p=.32), however. 
Hypothesis 8c (post-hoc): The pattern of ratings for motivation change showed that the 
selection of upward illness/downward coping targets resulted in almost no improvement. The 
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difference in motivation change between patients who chose upward illness/downward coping 
targets and those who chose other targets was not significant (F[1]=1.56, p=.21), however. 
Summary of findings for Research Question #8: Patients who chose upward 
illness/upward coping targets and downward illness/upward coping targets reported significant 
improvement in their overall motivation for self-care. Those who chose downward 
illness/downward coping targets and upward illness/downward coping targets reported no 
change. Change scores between pre- and post-selection ratings of motivation (both individually 
and aggregated) did not differ between selection groups. 
Research Question #9: What is the relationship between target selection and perceived 
similarity? After reading about their selected targets and rating affect and motivation, 
participants rated their perceived similarity. Participants were asked to reflect on the extent to 
which they focused on similarities between themselves and the target (i.e., identification) and the 
extent to which they focused on differences between themselves and the target (i.e., contrast). 
Ratings were separate to allow for the possibility that participants focused on neither, both, or 
one more so than the other. Only specific between-groups contrasts were appropriate for our 
hypotheses; descriptive statistics for identification and contrast between groups can be found in 
Table 10. Please refer to Figure 7 for graphical depiction of ratings for identification and 
contrast. 
Hypothesis 9a: The choice of upward illness/upward coping targets will correspond to 
higher ratings of identification than any other target. 
Patients who chose upward illness/upward coping targets did not endorse greater focus on 
similarities than patients who chose other targets (F[1]=.2.27, p=.13).  
Hypothesis 9b: The choice of upward illness/upward coping targets will correspond to 
lower ratings of contrast than any other target.  
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Patients who chose upward illness/upward coping targets endorsed less focus on 
differences than patients who chose other targets (F[1]=5.25, p=.023).  
Hypothesis 9c: The choice of downward illness/downward coping targets will correspond 
to lower ratings of identification than any other target. 
Patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets did not report less focus 
on similarities than patients who chose other targets (F[1]=.29, p=.59).  
Hypothesis 9d: The choice of downward illness/downward coping targets will correspond 
to higher ratings of contrast than any other target. 
Patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets did not report greater 
focus on differences than patients who chose other targets (F[1]=.08, p=.77).  
Summary of findings for Research Question #9: Patients who chose upward 
illness/upward coping targets focused less on differences (i.e., contrast) than other selection 
groups, but did not focus more on similarities (i.e., identification) than other groups. Patients 
who chose downward illness/downward coping targets did not report less identification or 
greater contrast than other selection groups.  
Research Question #10: Does perceived similarity moderate the effect of target selection on 
affective consequences or motivation for self-care? As noted, participants rated their affect and 
motivation for self-care both before and after reading about their chosen targets. Both affect and 
motivation were rated on multiple dimensions. Affect included stress, activation, valence 
(pleasantness), and excitement; self-care behaviors included following the recommended diet 
plan, exercising, testing blood glucose, and taking medications, as well as a total motivation for 
self-care score. After completing their post-comparison (reading) ratings of affect and 
motivation, participants reported the extent to which they focused on similarities (i.e., 
identification) and differences (i.e., contrast) between themselves and the target.  
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We did not have specific predictions about effects on individual dimensions of affect or 
motivation for self-care. In order to test the effects on every dimension without running 
individual tests (which increases the likelihood of Type I error), we used multivariate analyses 
(MANOVA; Wilks’s λ). Results for dimensions of affect (together in one test) and motivation as 
dependent variables (together in one test) are presented in turn. Because there is limited evidence 
to suggest the correct measurement of perceived similarity, we tested the effects of identification 
(focus on similarities) and contrast (focus on differences) separately.  
 Hypothesis 10a – Affect: Across groups, the interaction between target selection and 
identification was not significant when stress, mood, activation, and excitement were considered 
separately but simultaneously (Wilks’s λ=.94, F[12,434]=.81, p=.64). The interaction between 
target selection and contrast was significant, however (Wilks’s λ=.87, F[12,436]=2.04, p=.019). 
The interaction did not show a significant effect for mood or activation (ps>.05); the effect on 
stress was marginally significant (F[7,168]=2.49, p=.06), and the effect on excitement was 
significant (F[7,168]=3.37, p=.02).  
Specifically, we predicted that affect would be higher with greater identification with 
upward targets and for greater contrast against downward targets. The effect of identification was 
not significant; the effect of contrast, however, appears to follow the expected pattern. As shown 
in Figure 8, excitement decreases with greater contrast for patients who chose upward targets (on 
either dimension), whereas excitement increases with greater contrast for patients who chose the 
downward (only) target. 
Hypothesis 10b – Motivation. The interaction between target selection and contrast was 
not significant when diet, exercise, glucose testing, and medication adherence were considered 
simultaneously (Wilks’s λ=.97, F[12,431]=.49, p=.92). The interaction between target selection 
and identification was significant, however (Wilks’s λ=.86, F[12,428]=2.07, p=.017). The 
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interaction did not show a significant effect for diet or medication adherence (ps>.05); the 
effects on glucose testing (I[7,165]=2.94, p=.03) and exercise (I[7,165]=4.97, p=.003) were 
significant.  
Specifically, we predicted that affect would be higher with greater identification with 
upward targets and for greater contrast against downward targets. The effect of contrast was not 
significant; the effect of identification, however, appears to follow the expected pattern. As 
shown in Figure 8, motivation decreases with greater identification for patients who chose 
upward targets (on either dimension), whereas motivation increases with greater identification 
for patients who chose the downward (only) target. 
Summary of findings for Research Question #10: The extent to which patients focused 
on similarities between themselves and the target did not influence the effect of comparison 
selection on affect. The extent to which they focused on differences did influence this effect, in 
that patients who chose upward targets (illness and/or coping) experienced less excitement and 
greater stress the more they focused on differences; patients who chose downward (only) targets 
experienced greater excitement and less stress the more they focused on differences.  
This moderating effect was reversed for self-care motivation. The extent to which 
patients focused on differences between themselves and the target did not influence the effect of 
comparison selection on motivation. The extent to which they focused on similarities did 
influence this effect, in that patients who chose upward targets (illness and/or coping) 
experienced higher motivation for exercise and glucose testing the more they focused on 
similarities; patients who chose downward (only) targets lower motivation for exercise and 
glucose testing the more they focused on similarities. 
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Discussion 
Social comparison is a common way to learn about one’s standing in a given domain. 
When used to one’s advantage, this information can reduce uncertainty and anxiety, provide 
information about how to improve in the chosen domain, and motivate improvement-focused 
behavior. Comparisons also can increase anxiety about possible negative future states and lower 
motivation for behavior, if used in certain ways. At present, it is not clear why some comparisons 
lead to positive mood states or behaviors and others have negative effects on these outcomes. 
Previous literature suggests that features of the comparison process, context, and the individual 
making the comparison may contribute to differences in outcome (Arigo, Suls, & Smyth, 2012). 
Social comparisons may be especially important in the domain of health, as they may 
influence motivation for the behaviors that prevent illness and promote wellness. Individuals 
who have been diagnosed with chronic illnesses experience symptoms that threaten their long-
term health and create uncertainty about the future, which may provide extra incentive to gain 
health-relevant information from social comparisons. Comparisons may impact health directly 
(via physiological response) and/or indirectly (by motivating illness-specific self-care behaviors).  
Some understanding of the potential power of social comparisons is evident in the use of 
comparison targets in educational materials and interventions for patients with chronic illnesses 
(e.g., American Diabetes Association, 2011). Yet previous studies of social comparisons among 
patients show both positive and negative responses to comparisons, which demonstrates that 
some patients under some circumstances are worse off after  making a comparison (e.g., Buunk 
et al., 1990). Although the effects of an isolated comparison may be temporary, the consequences 
of repeated use of “negative outcome comparisons” are not yet known.  
Gaining a better understanding of the process, contextual, and individual difference 
factors that impact response to comparisons would improve intervention design and decisions 
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about implementation (e.g., for whom or when comparison-based interventions are most 
effective). The present study represents an initial step toward this goal. Two hundred patients 
who reported physician-verified diagnosis of type 2 diabetes mellitus completed a web-based 
study of personality characteristics, immediate affect, and response to a social comparison 
opportunity. Patients were asked to select one of four potential comparison targets (which 
differed by direction and specific health-relevant dimension) and read a short vignette about their 
chosen target. Response to the chosen comparison was captured in ratings of mood and 
motivation for self-care behaviors.  
This study thus address four main aspects of the comparison process: (1) relationships 
between trait-level comparison tendencies, other aspects of personality (e.g., neuroticism), and 
illness characteristics, (2) differences in personality, illness characteristics, and pre-comparison 
mood that are associated with target choice, (3) affective and motivational response to a selected 
comparison target, and (4) perceived similarity to the selected target. Findings related to each of 
these aspects of the comparison process will be discussed in the context of existing theoretical 
and empirical literature, and the clinical implications of this work will be considered. 
Between-Person Associations between Social Comparison Orientation and Personality/ 
Illness Indicators 
Our results show that at baseline, general tendency toward social comparison (social 
comparison orientation; SCO) varies between patients. This finding is consistent with previous 
demonstrations of social comparison as a trait-level construct in community, student, and chronic 
illness samples (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). In the present sample of patients with type 2 diabetes, 
general SCO was unrelated to physical markers of illness, but was associated with a range of 
indicators of emotional well-being. For example, individuals with endorsed stronger (versus 
weaker) SCO reported greater neuroticism, negative affect, diabetes concerns, and coping 
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difficulty. These associations also align with those found in previous studies (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999; Van der Zee, Buunk, DeRuiter, Tempelaar, & Sanderman, 1996; Van der Zee, Buunk, & 
Sanderman, 1996).  
Patients who endorsed stronger SCO also tended to have fewer years since their 
diagnosis, suggesting that they have had less time to adjust to their illness and its required self-
management. This relationship is consistent with findings from previous work. For example, 
cancer patients were more likely to report the use of comparisons (in daily diaries) at the 
beginning of an 8-week treatment program, relative to the end of treatment (Bogart & Helgeson, 
2000). It is possible that for patients who have been diagnosed more recently – who are likely to 
experience more uncertainty and have more concerns and more anxiety about their illness – 
social comparisons are particularly useful. In contrast, patients who were diagnosed in the distant 
past may have learned other methods for managing diabetes-related distress (e.g., objective 
methods such as testing blood sugar and adjusting intake accordingly; Garcia et al., 2001). 
Patients who were diagnosed recently also may be at greatest risk for mental health concerns 
such as depression. If these individuals rely on social comparisons, it will be especially important 
to understand the role of comparisons in adjustment and coping to a chronic illness diagnosis. 
These associations underscore the utility of gaining a better understanding of the how 
comparisons alleviate (versus perpetuate) distress and motivate positive health behaviors. 
Some preliminary clarification can be found in associations between patients’ tendencies 
toward upward and downward comparison. Although general SCO was not related to physical 
aspects of diabetes, upward and downward tendencies showed substantial association. In this 
sample, “sicker” patients (i.e., those with greater reported symptom severity, higher HbA1c levels, 
and higher BMIs) endorsed upward and downward SCO more so than patients who were less 
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sick. Upward comparison SCO was strongly associated with diabetes concerns, neuroticism, and 
negative affect, whereas downward comparison SCO was not related to these experiences.  
Patients who were diagnosed in the recent past also reported greater upward and 
downward SCO than patients who were diagnosed at earlier dates. In previous work, downward 
comparisons were more common right after cancer surgery, relative to later in time, but time 
since surgery was not associated with upward comparison use (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 
1985). Because our findings suggest that diabetes patients use both upward and downward 
comparisons sooner (versus later) after diagnosis, it is necessary to determine how each of these 
types of comparisons impact relevant outcomes (e.g., affect and motivation for self-care).  
Overall, it appears that patients who are more (versus less) physically and emotionally 
symptomatic tend to use comparisons more often, and are particularly prone to upward 
comparisons. If these patients repeatedly use upward contrast (i.e., focus on differences between 
themselves and an upward target), it is possible that consequent short-term negative affect serves 
to maintain long-term worry about one’s illness. Further, if this worry does not motivate positive 
health behaviors (i.e., there is no long-term positive health effect), it seems that patients may 
benefit from brief cognitive intervention to reframe comparisons in ways that are more favorable 
for health.  
The present study demonstrates that downward comparisons also are associated with poor 
physical and emotional health. This finding stands in contrast to previous work, which has shown 
that increased use of downward comparisons is associated with better health. For example, 
cancer patients who rated themselves as better-off than other patients (i.e., downward 
comparison) reported less physical and psychological distress and higher subjective well-being 
(concurrently; Van der Zee et al., 1996), as well as better quality of life (over time; Hagedoorn, 
Sneeuw, & Aaronson, 2002).  
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Such contradictory findings may reflect differences in the nature of cancer versus 
diabetes. Although both illnesses can be life-threatening, good self-care often can prevent serious 
symptoms of diabetes (e.g., neuropathy). Diabetes patients who use downward comparisons may 
experience increased positive affect (and/or decreased negative affect) from seeing themselves as 
“doing well.” The perception of doing well may do little to motivate self-care, and thus 
negatively impact actual health status (as symptoms get worse in the absence of positive health 
behaviors). Attention to health behaviors may not prevent the spreading of cancer cells (and 
consequent organ damage, etc.), however. Cancer patients who use downward comparisons also 
may experience improved affect and the perception of “doing well,” but the consequent effects 
on self-care may have less impact on actual health status. This explanation is admittedly 
speculative and requires further examination. Yet the divergence between present and existing 
findings highlights the need for experimental and behavioral methods to supplement (and 
potentially, to clarify) conclusions from correlational studies. 
How Well Do Individual Difference Characteristics Predict Target Choice?  
Previous research has demonstrated the relationship between “social comparisons” and a 
variety of indicators of illness severity, personality, and immediate subjective experience (e.g., 
mood). Because these findings were generated by studies that use narration methods (and thus, 
largely retrospective self-report), the extent to which illness severity, personality, and mood 
characteristics contribute to an individual instance of comparison is unclear. To address this 
issue, we tested the predictive power of: (1) individual characteristics, and (2) a model that 
included aspects of the aforementioned constructs.  
Illness status. As predicted, sicker patients made different target choices than did 
patients who were less sick. In fact, the more physically ill the patient (as indicated by reported 
symptom severity and HbA1c), the more physically and emotionally compromised the chosen 
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target. Thus, sick patients seemed to seek out information about someone who was “doing 
worse” (than the self). This finding appears to support Schachter’s (1959) assertion that “misery 
loves (miserable) company,” in that patients preferred targets whose symptoms were similar to or 
worse than their own – perhaps because downward comparisons can alleviate anxiety about 
one’s own status (Wills, 1981). 
This finding also reintroduces the question of whether (and when) patients actually 
“benefit” from downward comparisons, as it appears that downward comparisons in some way 
contribute to poorer health. (Or, at least, do little to improve it.) As noted, seeing oneself as 
“doing well” actually may lower motivation for self-care and thus negatively impact health. This 
appears to occur only in certain patients, however (which will be discussed further below). 
Determining benefit, both in terms of affective consequence and motivation for self-care, thus 
requires more fine-grained assessment than retrospective self-report can provide. The 
physiological consequences and symptoms of diabetes – and possibly, other chronic illnesses – 
that directly affect cognition (e.g., confusion or concentration difficulties related to 
hypoglycemia) also may influence the process of target selection, such that patients who 
experience certain symptoms at the time of target selection choose differently than those who 
experience other (or no) symptoms. Including an assessment of immediate physical state in 
future work may provide useful information about the process of target selection.  
Neuroticism and Social Comparison Orientation. General tendencies toward 
neuroticism and social comparisons have shown strong associations in the past (Van der Zee et 
al., 1998) and were strongly correlated in the present sample. As a result, it is somewhat 
surprising that neither set of traits was related to target selection. It is possible that patients’ 
actual comparisons (represented in behaviorally-demonstrated target selection) are different from 
those they self-report, indicating that their perceptions of past activity may be inaccurate. 
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Another explanation is that perceptions are accurate, but the behavior captured in the present 
study is not entirely representative of patients’ everyday comparisons.  
A third (and highly likely) possibility is that perceived similarity drives the trait-level 
relationship between neuroticism and social comparison orientation (c.f. Van der Zee, Buunk, & 
Sanderman, 1998; Van der Zee, Buunk, Sanderman, Botke, & van den Bergh, 2000). Patients 
with stronger (versus weaker) negative outlooks and higher (versus lower) negative affect are 
more motivated to use comparisons, but these also are patients who are apt to interpret 
comparisons negatively (i.e., downward identification and upward contrast). Although not tested 
in the present study, a reasonable approach to addressing this issue is to examine the 
relationships between neuroticism, social comparison orientation, and type of comparison (i.e., 
target choice-similarity combination, rather than target choice alone). Thus, neuroticism and 
social comparison orientation may not predict the type of target selected (in terms of direction 
and dimension), but may well predict negative-outcome comparisons to a range of targets. This 
proposition warrants further testing with a variety of research methods; greater clarification may 
help to appropriately identify patients who are likely to use negative-outcome comparisons. 
A model for predicting target selection. A larger prediction model included subjective 
illness severity, reported HbA1c, BMI, social comparison orientation (general, upward, and 
downward), neuroticism, and pre-selection mood. This model predicted target choice with 56% 
accuracy. Although the model performed much better than chance alone, it accounted for only 
16% of the variance in selection. Given the number of predictors, this (rather small) effect size 
suggests that there are additional factors that are important to the process of target selection. For 
example, perceived control over one’s circumstances may be particularly important among 
chronic illness patients. In earlier work, patients high in perceived control of their illness (versus 
low control) reported less frequent negative-outcome downward comparisons, both cross-
72 
 
 
sectionally (Bogart & Helgeson, 2000; Buunk et al., 1990) and over time (Bogart & Helgeson, 
2000). As noted, Schokker and colleagues (2010) recently demonstrated the moderating effect of 
regulatory focus on motivation for self-care. Although it would be impossible for any one study 
to capture all of the constructs that account for variance in a dynamic, situationally-bound 
behavior, this body of literature would benefit from further exploration of patient characteristics 
such as perceived control and regulatory focus. 
Behaviorally-Demonstrated Target Selection 
The primary aim of this study was to build upon retrospective self-report of comparison 
tendencies (i.e., narration methods) by capturing comparison and response as they occur. Both 
reaction and selection methods can accomplish this goal. Existing studies that use reaction 
methods to assess patient response to a given target have the advantage of experimental control, 
as participants are randomized to a target. Because reaction methods present only one target to 
each participant, however, these studies do not address patients’ preferences or reasons for 
choosing certain targets when options are presented (Wood, 1996). Selection methods, which can 
address questions about (reasons for) preference, rarely have been used in patient samples. 
Patients have opportunities to choose from multiple comparison targets in many real-world 
situations. For example, many patients visit medical centers and encounter various other patients 
(e.g., in the waiting room), participate in support or educational groups, and read posts in online 
illness-related forums. Consequently, examining the process of target choice (via selection 
methods) and potential range of outcomes is an important step toward understanding the impact 
of ubiquitous social information on patients with chronic illness. 
In the present study, diabetes patients were asked to choose from four distinct targets. 
Differences between targets were based on key aspects of comparisons known to influence 
preference and affective response. Targets differed by direction (upward versus downward) and 
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dimension (illness severity and coping effectiveness), creating four options: (1) upward 
illness/upward coping (a patient with mild symptoms who is coping well), (2) downward 
illness/upward coping (a patients with severe symptoms who is coping well), (3) upward 
illness/downward coping (a patient with mild symptoms who is not coping well), and (4) 
downward illness/downward coping (a patient with severe symptoms who is not coping well). 
Previous theoretical and empirical work suggests that the selection of each of these targets is 
associated with specific reasons (e.g., the desire to gain information about how to improve; 
Festinger, 1954) and consequences (e.g., increased negative affect; Hemphill & Lehman, 1993). 
We first examined the distribution of target selection, which showed that not all 
comparison targets are created equal. Across the sample, 44% of patients showed a preference 
for targets who were “doing well” in terms of both physical symptoms and emotional response 
(coping). Similarly, 34% of the sample showed a preference for targets who were staying 
positive (coping) despite severe physical symptoms. Thus, 78% of the sample chose a target who 
was coping well, regardless of illness severity. Targets who were struggling with their emotional 
responses to mild or severe symptoms were appealing to only 22% of the sample (13% and 9%, 
respectively).  
These behaviorally-demonstrated preferences are somewhat inconsistent with 
retrospective reports of comparison activity, which suggest that patients use downward 
comparisons more often than upward (Buunk et al., 1990; DeVellis et al., 1990; Hemphill & 
Lehman, 1991; Heidrich, 1996; Van der Zee et al., 1996). These reports do not often differentiate 
between illness severity and coping dimensions, however. Patients in one existing study that did 
use separate dimensions showed similar reported preferences (i.e., Likert ratings), in that patients 
were partial to upward targets for coping information and downward targets for illness severity 
information (Bennenbroek et al., 2002). 
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Target selection in the present study does align with affiliative desires expressed in 
previous work that used reaction methods. In these earlier studies, patients who read about an 
upward (versus downward) coping target endorsed stronger desires for support and information 
from the target (Stanton et al., 1999; Derlega et al., 2005; 2009). It is possible that patients view 
targets with coping difficulties as particularly anxiety-provoking, and thus opt for less 
threatening targets (i.e., those who were coping well). The relationships between target selection 
and reason for choice, affective consequence, and resulting motivation for self-care behavior are 
examined below. 
Comparison Responses of Each Selection Group 
Upward illness/upward coping targets: Multiple short-term benefits. Patients who 
chose upward illness/upward coping targets reported less severe symptoms, lower HbA1c levels, 
and somewhat lower stress levels (just before selection) than patients who chose other targets 
Those who chose upward illness/upward coping targets did not differ from other patients with 
respect to neuroticism, social comparison orientation, mood valence, or arousal. These patients 
also focused somewhat more on similarities between themselves and the target, relative to 
differences, and focused on differences somewhat less than patients who chose other targets. 
Patients reported choosing the upward illness/upward coping target to gain information about 
how to improve their situations, boost their confidence in their ability to improve, and learn that 
others have similar experiences. These patients reported a significant increase in their motivation 
for self-care from pre- to post-comparison. This increase was highest among patients who 
identified with, rather than contrasted against, their selected target. 
Although feeling better about their situations was not strongly endorsed as a reason for 
this choice, patients who chose the upward illness/upward coping target also showed a trend 
toward improved mood from pre- to post-comparison. Thus at an explicit level, the choice of an 
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upward illness/upward coping target appears motivated by the desires for affiliation (i.e., 
knowing that others share their circumstances; Schachter, 1959), functional or procedural 
information (i.e., ways to improve; Festinger, 1954), and increased self-efficacy for healthy 
behaviors (i.e., increased confidence in one’s ability to manage a chronic illness; e.g., Bandura, 
1982). The choice of an upward illness/upward coping target also seems to serve Taylor and 
Lobel’s (1989) proposed desire for hope of improvement, however; patients did not report 
making this choice to improve their mood, but their ratings indicate that they felt more pleasant 
after (versus before) reading about an upward illness/upward coping target.  
It is possible that improved mood is an unanticipated bonus of comparisons to upward 
illness/upward coping targets. It also is possible that this outcome is foreseeable but the desire 
for it is outside of conscious awareness, or that it is foreseeable and conscious but not perceived 
as a “good” reason for making a choice. In other words, patients may have viewed presenting 
oneself as the type of person who values improvement and self-management (rather than feeling 
good) as socially desirable.  
Overall, it appears that patients who report better illness status choose upward targets in 
order to improve their health. These patients tend to identify (versus contrast against) their 
chosen target, feel good after making the comparison, and experience increased motivation for 
self-care. The choice of an upward illness/upward coping target thus seems associated with, and 
may help maintain, better physical health and more positive affect. These findings are consistent 
with those of previous studies that demonstrate the potential benefits of upward comparisons 
(e.g., Dibb, 2009; Heidrich, 1996; Kulik, Mahler, & Moore, 1996), and builds upon this earlier 
work by illustrating the appeal of targets that are “doing well” on two health-relevant 
dimensions. 
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Downward illness/upward coping targets: Potential for improvement in motivation 
for self-care. Based on existing findings that suggest the positive effects of downward illness 
and upward coping targets (presented separately; Bennenbroek et al., 2002), we predicted that a 
combined downward illness/upward coping target would both appeal to our sample and result in 
desirable consequences (e.g., improved mood, increased motivation for self-care). A downward 
illness/downward coping target did not perform quite as expected, however. This target was 
selected by 34% of the sample; patients who chose downward illness/upward coping targets were 
somewhat sicker (in terms of reported HbA1c and symptom severity), relative to an upward 
illness/upward coping target.   
Similar to patients who chose upward illness/upward coping targets, patients who chose 
downward illness/upward coping targets rated gaining information about how to improve and 
boosting confidence in their ability to improve as top reasons for their choice. Low ratings of the 
desire for mood improvement in this group may be related to social desirability. Unlike those 
who chose upward illness/upward coping targets, however, patients who chose downward 
illness/upward coping targets did not report improved mood from pre- to post-comparison, but 
did experience increased motivation for self-care. This effect was particularly strong for 
motivation to take medication. It is possible that the affective and motivational effects of 
comparisons are not directly related, such that improved mood is not a pathway to increased 
motivation (or vice versa). To our knowledge, this is the first study to test the impact of 
comparisons on both affect and motivation for self-care. On average, who chose downward 
illness/upward coping targets focused approximately equally on identification and contrast; 
increased motivation was associated with greater identification with the target. 
Upward illness/downward coping Targets: The enigmatic choice. Our a priori ideas 
about patients who choose upward illness/downward coping targets were speculative and 
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generated no specific hypotheses, as there is little data to indicate how this combination might 
impact patients. The one existing study that addresses direction-by-dimension preferences 
demonstrates that patients express preferences for downward (versus upward) illness targets and 
upward (versus downward) coping targets (Bennenbroek et al., 2002). As a result, our upward 
illness/downward coping target likely combined two kinds of undesirable information. 
Common sense suggests that an upward illness/downward coping target might confuse 
patients; whereas individuals who are emotionally well despite severe physical symptoms may 
be inspiring, individuals who are distressed about mild symptoms may be perceived as weak, 
dramatic, or irrational. Indeed, few patients in our sample were keen on this target, as only 13% 
selected it. Sicker patients were more likely to choose an upward illness/downward coping target 
(relative to an upward illness/upward coping target), but it is not clear what may be gained from 
this choice. 
Patients who choose the upward illness/downward coping target endorsed gaining 
information about how to improve and learning that others share their circumstances most 
strongly, although even these ratings were barely greater than moderate. These patients 
experienced only slight (nonsignificant) improvements in mood; overall change in motivation for 
self-care was negligible, and motivation for medication adherence showed a (nonsignificant) 
reduction. Patients who chose the upward illness/downward coping target also contrasted 
somewhat more than they identified, but overall motivation appeared to improve with increased 
identification.  
The upward illness/downward coping target thus remains the most obscure of the targets 
available in the present study. It is not clear what makes patients choose this target (with respect 
to individual difference characteristics and reported reasons for choice), nor is there indication 
that this choice benefitted patients in any way. In fact, this choice seemed to work against 
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patients in terms of motivation, which could have negative long-term outcomes (Shigaki et al., 
2010). This target may be inappropriate for use in patient care until we better understand who 
responds well to this target combination and under what circumstances positive outcome(s) can 
be expected. 
Downward illness/downward coping targets: Both negative and positive 
consequences. Previous findings show that downward comparisons are associated with better 
physical and emotional health among patients with chronic illness (e.g., Hagedoorn, Sneeuw, & 
Aaronson, 2002). It would be logical to expect that patients who are in better health have more 
frequent opportunities for downward comparison, which in turn protect against health declines. 
Our data suggest the opposite, however. Sicker patients chose downward (only) targets; patients 
with higher reported symptom severity and HbA1c were more likely to choose a downward 
illness/downward coping target (relative to an upward illness/upward coping target). 
Understanding the use of social information among the sickest patients is particularly important 
for patient care, as these individuals are at the highest risk for comorbid mental health conditions 
(Peveler, Carson, & Rodin, 2002) and poor self-care (e.g., medication nonadherence; DiMatteo, 
Haskard, & Williams, 2007). 
Unlike other target selection groups, patients who chose downward illness/downward 
coping targets showed almost no variation across ratings for reason choices. Given that only 9% 
of our sample chose this target, however, a lack of within-group differences may be due to low 
power (for such “subgroup” analyses) rather than a true equality in weight across reasons. These 
patients also  contrasted slightly more than they identified with their chosen target 
(nonsignificant) and the largest improvements in motivation were associated with less 
identification. Patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets were the only 
participants to show benefit from less, rather than more, identification.  
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This finding is consistent with theoretical work that suggests the potential disadvantages 
of downward identification (e.g., Buunk & Ybema, 1997), and builds upon existing work in an 
important way. Previous studies have examined the potential impact of upward and downward 
identification (versus contrast), but have not differentiated illness and coping dimensions. In fact, 
several studies do not clearly identify the dimension; targets are described as having “more (or 
less) difficulty” than the patient participant (e.g., Van der Zee et al., 1999), which could mean 
physical difficulty, emotional difficulty, or both. The present study demonstrates that downward 
identification may be problematic if the target is both physically and emotionally compromised, 
but not if the target is “doing poorly” on only one of these dimensions. 
Although mood change did not reach significance (also likely due to low power), it is 
noteworthy that those who chose downward illness/downward coping targets were the only 
patients to report worsened mood valence from pre- to post-comparison. Despite a potential 
worsening in mood, however, patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets 
reported consistent improvement in their motivation across individual self-care behaviors and 
showed the greatest overall improvement in motivation for self-care. Here, it appears that 
(reported) affective consequences are not congruent with motivation, in that mood worsens while 
motivation improves.  
Evidence from other domains of psychology provides some context for this finding. For 
example, negative affect has been shown to induce greater motivation for and demonstration of a 
desirable behavior (e.g., voting; Panagopoulis, 2010), relative to positive affect. As noted, it is 
possible that short-term negative affect consequent to comparisons results in long(er)-term 
behavioral benefit. The duration of this benefit and the impact of comparisons on actual patient 
behavior require empirical investigation. 
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In sum, it appears that an objective measure of illness severity is associated with target 
choice; the sicker the patient, the more likely he or she is to choose a target who is not doing 
well. The choice of upward illness/upward coping targets leads to immediate improvements in 
mood and motivation for self-care, particularly among those who identify with the chosen target. 
Downward illness/upward coping targets and downward illness/downward coping targets have 
parallel effects on motivation without the benefit of improved mood; downward illness/ 
downward coping targets actually may worsen mood while increasing motivation. Upward 
illness/downward coping targets did not lead to significant changes in affect or motivation. 
The Role of Perceived Similarity  
Perceived similarity is difficult to operationalize and measure, for several reasons. Most 
problematic is that there are multiple theoretical approaches to this idea (e.g., assimilation versus 
contrast, attainment likelihood) that are not often assessed in empirical studies. Authors who 
have attempted to capture perceived similarity have done so using implicit measurement of 
reaction time (e.g., Stapel & Suls, 2004) or Likert-style rating scales (e.g., Van der Zee et al., 
1999). Using the latter assumes that participants can accurately reflect on the extent of their 
identification and/or contrast, which may occur rapidly and without conscious processing. Given 
the resource-intensive nature of implicit measurement, however, there is value in attempting to 
empirically establish the utility of this construct to determine whether investment in other 
methods is warranted. 
In the present study, we asked participants to what degree they focused on similarities 
(identification) and differences (contrast) between themselves and their chosen targets. It is 
possible that identification and contrast are at opposite ends of the same continuum, but it also is 
possible that they are orthogonal. Measuring aspects of perceived similarity as separate 
dimensions of focus is the more inclusive method; this approach allows for the calculation of a 
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difference score (e.g., identification – contrast), which may capture between-person variability in 
relative focus. For example, some individuals may focus on similarities and differences to the 
same degree (high or low for both), or may focus on one much more so than the other. Indeed, 
our findings show some variability in identification, contrast, and the difference between 
identification and contrast in each target selection group. As previous work has not fully 
addressed the appropriate measurement of perceived similarity (e.g., Dibb & Yardley, 2006, 
Study 2; Van der Zee et al., 1999), the present study provides a novel approach and preliminary 
evidence to indicate that identification and contrast should be measured separately. 
Our findings also suggest several important features of perceived similarity. First, 
patients in all groups did some identification and some contrast, which suggests that they likely 
represent distinct constructs. Second, only patients who chose upward illness/upward coping 
targets did more identification than contrast; patients who chose downward targets (on either 
dimension) contrasted slightly more than they identified. Third, the ratio of contrast to 
identification does not appear to be related to affective or motivational consequences of 
comparisons. Although this lack of effect may be an artifact of too little difference between 
identification and contrast (possibly due to low power in some target selection groups), the 
unique effects of identification and contrast are noteworthy and have not yet been examined.  
Among patients who chose upward targets (on either dimension), greater contrast is 
associated with worse mood. This effect is reversed among patients who chose downward 
illness/downward coping targets, such that greater contrast is associated with better mood. 
Identification appears to have the opposite effect on motivation; among patients who chose 
upward targets (on either dimension), greater identification is associated with higher motivation. 
For patients who chose downward illness/downward coping targets, greater identification is 
associated with lower motivation. These findings provide quantitative support for qualitative 
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descriptions of comparisons among diabetes patients (Gorawara-Bhat, Huang, & Chin, 2008; 
Huang, Gorawara-Bhat, & Chin, 2005), which suggests that contrast is associated with reported 
affect and identification is associated with motivation to engage in self-care. 
At present, it is unclear why contrast impacts mood while identification does not, and 
why identification impacts motivation while contrast does not. Developments in social 
comparison theory shed some light on this finding; for example, Mussweiler (2003) emphasizes 
that contrast adds psychological distance between the self from the target. With increased 
distance, contrast may reduce or eliminate the self-relevance of a target’s illness behaviors, and 
thereby fail to impact a patient’s behavioral intention. In other words, a patient who focuses on 
differences between the self and the target may not see the information gained from the target as 
useful for informing his or her behavior. Identification, which reduces the psychological distance 
between the self and the target, may increase the self-relevance of social information and thus 
have a greater impact on motivation for healthy behavior. This impact is either positive or 
negative, depending on the type of comparison target. This idea does not adequately explain the 
effect of contrast, however. It is possible that identification and contrast occur at distinct points 
in the comparison process, which increases the salience of behavioral and affective information 
at different times (respectively). This proposition requires direct testing and integration with the 
broader social comparison literature. 
Differences in Target Selection and Response: Implications for Social Comparison Theory 
Findings from the present study address several aspects of social comparison theory that 
previously lacked empirical support. Related to the process of social comparison, the present 
study demonstrated that several factors thought to be relevant to may not differentiate types of 
comparers. For example, although patients who are highly neurotic differ from those who are 
less neurotic in terms of their overall social comparison tendencies (general and upward SCO; 
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c.f. Van der Zee et al., 1996; 1999), neuroticism was unrelated to a live instance of target 
selection.  
It is possible that this particular instance of target selection simply was not representative 
of the typical social comparison process. Also noteworthy is that the method used in the present 
study captured aspects of the process that have not been assessed in prior work. Previous studies 
typically have not provided target options that differ by both direction and dimension, for 
example. In the present study, patients had a greater number of opportunities to engage in 
negative-outcome comparisons (i.e., upward contrast and/or downward identification; Buunk & 
Ybema, 1997; Hemphill & Lehman, 1993), and may have done so irrespective of their chosen 
targets. The current findings thus offer further evidence to support the notion that the type of 
target may be less influential than a patient’s cognitive approach (i.e., perceived similarity). It 
would be useful to examine the relationships between baseline neuroticism and affective 
response (rather than target choice), which was not included in the present study.  
Results from the present study also provide additional empirical evidence to support the 
Identification/Contrast Model (Buunk & Ybema, 1997). Existing evidence relies on retrospective 
self-report, which may not accurately reflect the comparison process or outcomes; the present 
study adds a live, behavioral demonstration of target selection that captures perceived similarity 
immediately after it is thought to occur. In previous work, perceived similarity was measured as 
one continuum, with identification at one end and contrast at the other (e.g., Dibb, 2009). 
Findings from the present study show that identification and contrast likely are two separate 
constructs. Moreover, the distinction between these constructs is important for comparison 
outcome: contrast moderates affective response to a target, whereas identification moderates 
consequent motivation for self-care. Further work is necessary to replicate this finding and to 
explain the differential impact on affect and motivation for self-care. 
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Finally, the present study is (to our knowledge) the first to assess patients’ conscious 
reasons for selecting one target over another. The reasons included in this study were derived 
from theoretical work in this area (e.g., Wills, 1981, Taylor & Lobel, 1989). Although these 
authors provide compelling rationale for the expectation that comparisons serve to regulate mood 
(e.g., reduce distress), patients do not strongly endorse “feeling better” as a reason for their 
selections. As noted, it is possible that this motivation is outside of conscious awareness or 
simply not seen as a socially acceptable reason for target choice.  
Regardless of target choice, patients highly endorse Festinger’s (1954) proposed global 
motivation for social comparison: to gain information about how to improve status. Perhaps 
Festinger was correct, and it is interest in improvement that drives social comparisons. Some 
skepticism is warranted, however. Patients who participated in this study (i.e., those who have 
been diagnosed with T2DM by a physician) are likely to have some level of engagement with the 
healthcare system. Healthcare providers (and possibly loved ones) offer behavioral 
recommendations, encouragement to adopt healthy behaviors, and often, admonishment when 
patients do not adhere to recommendations. Because this atmosphere reinforces efforts to 
improve, patients may be motivated to present themselves as interested in improvement. This 
possibility, which is intrinsic to self-report methods, highlights the potential utility of implicit 
measures of motivation (as well as other constructs relevant to social comparison). 
Implications for Clinical Intervention and Patient Care 
Social comparisons represent an important source of information about one’s status in a 
variety of domains. The present study builds upon existing literature that demonstrates both 
positive and negative consequences of comparisons, and underscores the broader associations 
between poor health and increased use of comparisons. Individuals whose physical and/or 
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emotional health is compromised may have increased desire for social information (Taylor et al., 
1989), but greater reliance on this information does not appear to have a protective effect.  
The present study shows that certain individuals may be prone to use comparisons in 
ways that further compromise their health (e.g., by negatively impacting mood and/or motivation 
for self-care). Similar findings have shown that negative-outcome social comparisons play a role 
in body dissatisfaction and disordered eating (e.g., Corning, Krum, & Smitham, 2006) and 
depression (e.g., Gibbons, 1986). As a result, addressing comparisons in clinical care may be a 
beneficial supplement to cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT). For example, a core component 
of CBT is teaching patients to challenge their cognitive distortions and negative expectations 
(e.g., catastrophizing; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  
Explicitly including negative-outcome social comparisons in the list of cognitive 
distortions would allow clinicians to combat an additional factor that may serve to maintain 
patients’ pathology. Interventions that include the opportunity to consider and/or challenge social 
information have shown promise for improving health behavior among college students (e.g., 
negative consequences of alcohol consumption: Turner, Perkins, & Bauerle, 2008; problematic 
dieting: Lew et al., 2006), and may be appropriate for other populations. In settings where brief 
interventions are preferable (e.g., primary care), providing a set of “instructions” to focus on 
similarities or differences between the self and a target could be beneficial (Arigo, Behnke, & 
Smyth, 2012). 
Chronic illness care. Opportunities for social comparison are ubiquitous for many 
patients with chronic illnesses. These individuals often are encouraged to engage in interventions 
that are inherently social. Most obvious is the availability of support groups (live or web-based). 
Although these interventions may include psychoeducation about illness self-care, a key 
component is the sharing of health-relevant information. Even without explicit description of 
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one’s symptoms, health status may be obvious through behavioral presentation (e.g., walking 
speed, expressions of pain or dizziness). Potential comparison targets also are presented in 
educational materials and discussions with health care providers.  
The body of literature on patients’ comparisons supports the notion that comparisons may 
be helpful, but provides a word of caution in the demonstration that not all patients respond well 
to all types of comparisons (see Arigo, Suls, & Smyth, 2012). Findings from the present study 
clarify this conclusion by moving toward identifying patients who might be vulnerable to 
negative-outcome comparisons. Sicker patients show behavioral preference for patients who 
have severe symptoms and/or are not coping well. In this subset, patients who focus more on 
similarities between themselves and the target experience decreased motivation for self-care 
behaviors, and those who focus more on differences experience improved mood. Conversely, 
patients who focus less on similarities with the target experience increased motivation, and those 
who focus less on differences experience worsened mood. The effects are reversed among less 
sick patients, who prefer targets who are doing well; these patients experience higher motivation 
for self-care with greater focus on similarities and better mood with less focus on differences. 
These findings suggest potential treatment recommendations that are tailored to an 
individual’s illness severity. Sicker patients might do best if offered a downward comparison 
target and encouraged to focus on differences between themselves and the target; less sick 
patients might do best if offered an upward comparison target and encouraged to focus on 
similarities between themselves and the target. The efficacy of tailoring interventions to patient 
characteristics has long been recognized, but rarely implemented (Forthofer & Bryant, 2000). 
The present findings leave open several important questions about how to tailor social 
comparison opportunities, however. For example, how would a provider determine whether a 
patient is sick enough to benefit from a downward target? Should the target be doing poorly with 
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both illness symptoms and coping, or just one of these dimensions (and which one)? Strong 
recommendations for changes to patient care will depend on the outcome of future research, 
which will be necessary to replicate the present findings and address remaining questions about 
matching comparison opportunities to patient characteristics. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Present Study 
The present study contributes to the literature on social comparisons among patients with 
chronic illness in several ways. First, this study incorporated two distinct methods for capturing 
social comparison. Narration methods rely on retrospective report of comparison activity and 
address questions about trait-level aspects of personality and illness. Selection methods present a 
range of comparison opportunities and capture comparison choices and responses as they occur 
(Wood, 1996). Given that selection methods are rarely used in chronic illness samples, the 
present study offers a unique opportunity to examine behaviorally-demonstrated preference 
among patients. In addition, using both methods allowed for direct evaluation of congruence 
between sets of findings. To our knowledge, this is one of the only existing studies that blends 
narration and selection methods. 
Second, the format of target selection in the present study has the advantage of high 
external validity. In an era of increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous technology, many 
patients with chronic illness use online media as sources of information about their conditions 
(Millard & Fintak, 2002). Although “objective” sources exist (e.g., reputable websites that 
provide education and expert advice), the popularity of online discussion forums for various 
illnesses speaks to the desire for information from others who share similar circumstances. For 
example, the site diabetesdaily.com has over 73,000 forum members who engage in discussion 
threads and comment on blog posts. The process of interacting with some patients over others 
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involves multiple decision points – all of which offer opportunities for selected social 
comparisons. 
A web-based data collection method also broadened the potential reach of this study, 
presenting many more opportunities to administer the procedure than would in-person 
appointments. Furthermore, computerized data collection reduces the probability of human error. 
Given the sizable number of questionnaires and stimulus materials used in this study, which 
require presentation in a specific sequence, the probability for mistakes would be high if research 
staff had manually administered the proposed procedure. Online methods are thus wide-reaching, 
cost-effective, and less prone to individual instances of human error than are other methods. 
Online data collection also represented a unique opportunity to generate a large sample for the 
present study. 
Online recruitment and data collection are not without challenges, however. For example, 
medical status cannot be objectively verified using online methods, leaving open the possibility 
that some participants did not meet criteria for a T2DM diagnosis. We attempted to limit this 
problem by requiring that participants provide their most recent HbA1c level, as knowledge of this 
information might discriminate between patients and non-patients. Perhaps more problematic is 
that online recruitment and data collection limit participation to patients who use the internet. 
This allows for self-selection bias and reduced generalizability to the larger population of T2DM 
patients. Indeed, the present sample is not widely representative of the general T2DM population 
with respect to ethnicity or socioeconomic status (Centers for Disease Control, 2011). The 
characteristics of our sample thus require that we do not generalize beyond the subset of T2DM 
patients who use the internet. 
An additional drawback of basic online data collection is its restriction to self-reported 
information. As noted, objective assessment of medical status, including height and weight (for 
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BMI calculation), was not possible online. Although we were able to devise a behavioral 
measure of target preference, our software was not sophisticated enough for non-explicit 
measures of perceived similarity, reasons for target choice, or affective response to the selected 
target. Objective verification of the present findings and expansion to implicit measures of 
relevant constructs are thus areas of opportunity for future work. 
Conclusions 
 Social comparisons are a key source of self-relevant information for patients with chronic 
illness, but can lead to either positive or negative consequences for health. Examining 
comparison targets who are self-selected provides the unique opportunity to capture information 
about various steps in the process of social comparison. The present study provides several new 
insights into this process. Relevant to social comparison theory, the present findings suggest that 
identification with and contrast against a target can occur simultaneously and have distinct 
effects on affect and motivation for behavior. Additional work is necessary to replicate and 
further elucidate this distinction, which will contribute to our basic understanding of the impact 
of a common social-cognitive process. Relevant to patient care, findings show that individual 
differences in social comparison selection are associated with physical symptom severity, and 
that affective and motivational responses to the selected target depend on the patient’s perceived 
similarity to the target. Social comparisons naturally occur in clinical care settings, but also are 
provided to patients as aspects of various interventions. The present findings demonstrate the 
potential clinical benefit of improving our understanding of patients’ comparison use in daily 
life, which may inform revisions to comparison opportunities provided in formal interventions.  
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1. Although lateral comparisons are common (e.g., Bennenbroek et al., 2002; Bogart & 
Helgeson, 2000), they often are left out of empirical investigation. This may be because 
they are not thought to introduce threat, which was the original point of interest for 
applied social comparison work (e.g., Wills, 1981). The most problematic practical 
concern is that it would be difficult to design a comparison target that is at the “same” 
level as a given participant. It would be exponentially more difficult, if not impossible, to 
design “same-level” targets for an entire sample, which will include between-person 
variability on multiple relevant dimensions. 
 
2. Ratings of preference are present-oriented, measuring what patients want at the moment 
they are asked. Preference also is hypothetical, in that stated preferences typically do not 
result in the presentation of information about the preferred target. 
 
3. Schokker et al. (2010) was published several months after the present study was initiated. 
As a result, the present study does not include assessment of the potential moderating 
variables identified by Schokker et al. (2010). 
 
4. Correlations were calculated for the Center for Epidemiologic Studies–Depression Scale 
(Radloff, 1977) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). These measures were included in the questionnaire battery but were not 
examined in the present study. 
 
  
 
91 
 
 
Table 1. Participant characteristics. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 M SD 
   
Age 49.07 11.10 
Body Mass Index (BMI) 33.46 6.63 
Years since diagnosis 6.24 6.82 
HbA1c 7.59 1.75 
   
 Frequency Percent of Sample 
   
Sex   
   Male 110 55% 
   Female 90 45% 
   
Race   
   Caucasian 215 87% 
    African American 7 3% 
   Hispanic/Latino 9 4% 
   Native American 5 2% 
    Asian 8 3% 
    Multiracial 4 1% 
   
Marital Status   
   Married 184 74% 
   Widowed 9 4% 
   Divorced/Annulled 20 8% 
   Separated 4 2% 
   Never married 30 12% 
   
Children   
   Yes 183 75% 
   No 60 25% 
   
Annual Household Income   
   Less than $20,000 24 10% 
   $20,000-$40,000 22 9% 
   $40,000-60,000 30 12% 
   $60,000-$80,000 43 18% 
   $80,000-$100,000 34 14% 
   More than $100,000 91 37% 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3. Correlations of Social Comparison Orientation with diabetes-specific experiences and 
personality characteristics. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  Overall Orientation Upward Orientation Downward Orientation 
       
Reported Severity  0.004   0.16*   0.21** 
Reported A1c  0.09   0.25**   0.25** 
Years Since Diagnosis -0.43***  -0.41***  -0.35*** 
Body Mass Index -0.11  -0.17*  -0.33*** 
Self-Rated Coping  0.32***   0.38***   0.35*** 
Diabetes Concerns  0.15*   0.19**   0.05 
Neuroticism  0.21**   0.31***   0.11 
Positive Affect -0.23**  -0.40***  -0.31*** 
Negative Affect  0.23**   0.34***   0.10 
      
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression analysis of target selection as a function of illness 
severity, personality characteristics, and immediate affect. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables  B 
Wald 
χ2-test p-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
     Lower Upper 
       
Reported Severity 0.58 9.23 0.0024 0.21 0.95 
       
Reported A1c 0.28 10.24 0.0014 0.12 0.46 
       
BMI  0.008 0.25 0.62 -0.02 0.04 
       
Neuroticism 0.002 0.03 0.87 -0.03 0.03 
 
Comparison Orientation (General) 
    Upward Comparison 
    Downward Comparison 
 
Affect 
    Stress 
    Mood valence (pleasantness) 
    Activation 
    Excitement 
 
-0.02 
  0.01 
  0.02 
 
 
 0.27 
 0.24 
-0.14 
 0.02 
 
0.98 
0.41 
0.53 
 
 
3.02 
2.19 
0.49 
0.01 
 
0.32 
0.52 
0.47 
 
 
0.08 
0.14 
0.48 
0.93 
 
-0.07 
-0.04 
-0.03 
 
 
-0.03 
-0.08 
-0.05 
-0.44 
 
0.02 
0.07 
0.08 
 
 
0.58 
0.57 
0.25 
0.48 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Reference group = upward illness/upward coping; χ2 and p-values for (marginally) significant predictors are 
italicized. 
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Table 7. Accuracy of discriminant function analysis (DFA) classifications by target selection 
group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 Actual Selection Group   
      
Predicted 
Classification  UI/UC DI/UC UI/DC DI/DC Total 
       
UI/UC  39 15 13 12 79 
  49% 19% 16% 15% 100% 
       
DI/UC  6 34 10 12 62 
  7% 55% 16% 19% 100% 
       
UI/DC  3 3 12 3 21 
  14% 14% 58% 14% 100% 
       
DI/DC  0 1 0 15 16 
  0% 6% 0% 94% 100% 
       
Total  49 53 35 42 178 
  27% 30% 20% 23% 100% 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: UI/UC = upward illness/upward coping; DI/DC = downward illness/downward coping; UI/DC = upward 
illness/downward coping; DI/DC = downward illness/downward coping.
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics for reasons for target selection by selection group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  UIUC DIUC UIDC DIDC 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
             
  Gain information 3.62 0.88 3.53 0.97 3.41 1.14 3.07 0.73 
  Boost confidence 3.23 1.02 3.34 0.85 3.00 0.98 3.27 1.03 
  Feel better 2.72 1.04 2.97 0.97 2.77 1.02 3.07 1.10 
  Others with same situation 3.46 0.75 3.19 0.97 3.18 1.14 3.19 0.91 
  Confirm gravity of situation 2.11 1.05 2.39 1.09 2.36 1.00 2.93 1.10 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Note: UI/UC = upward illness/upward coping; DI/DC = downward illness/downward coping; UI/DC = upward 
illness/downward coping; DI/DC = downward illness/downward coping.
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Figure 3. Study Procedures 
 
 
 
Presentation of Eligibility Criteria 
Informed Consent 
Trait Measures (Individual Difference Characteristics 
Duration of Illness 
Social Comparison Style (IN-COM) 
Neuroticism (EPQ) 
Coping with Diabetes (PAID) 
Illness Severity 
 
Pre-Selection Affect and Motivation for Self-Care 
Affect: Arousal, Valence, Stress, Excitement 
Motivation: Diet, exercise, glucose testing, medication 
adherence 
 
Target Selection 
Upward Coping 
Upward Illness 
Upward Coping 
Downward Illness 
Downward Coping 
Upward Illness 
 
Downward Coping 
Downward Illness 
 
Reasons for Selection 
Presentation of Target (Vignette)  
Post-Selection Affect 
Arousal 
Valence 
Interpretation (Similarity) 
Identification 
Contrast 
Motivation for Improvement 
Diet, exercise, glucose testing, 
medication adherence 
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Figure 4. Reasons for target choice by target selection. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Between-groups 
 
 
Within groups 
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Figure 5. Change in affect dimensions from pre- to post-comparison by target selection group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 6. Change in motivation for self-care behaviors from pre- to post-comparison by target 
selection group. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 7. Perceived similarity by target selection. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 8. Interaction effects of target selection and perceived similarity on affect and motivation. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Affect
 
 
Motivation 
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Appendix A: Measures 
Patient Rating Scale (Pilot Study) 
 
In general, how many symptoms does this patient seem to have?  
 
     1                   2                           3               4  5 
Very Few                      Very Many 
 
 
How severe do this patient’s symptoms seem? 
     
     1                   2                           3               4  5 
Very Mild            Extremely Severe 
 
 
 
How well does this person seem to be coping with his/her symptoms? 
 
     1                   2                           3               4  5 
Very Well                     Very Poorly 
 
 
Compared to this patient, how severe are your diabetes symptoms? 
 
     1                   2                           3               4  5 
Much Better                    Much Worse 
 
 
Compared to this patient, how well are you coping with your symptoms? 
 
     1                   2                           3               4  5 
Much Better                    Much Worse 
 
 
How did you feel after you read about this patient? 
 
 
What thoughts did you have after you read about this patient? 
 
 
What aspects of this person’s illness were noticeable to you? 
 
 
What aspects of this person’s coping were noticeable to you? 
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Demographics 
1. What is your birth date?  Month  ___ ___ / Day ___ ___ / Year ___ ___ 
 
2. What is your current age?  ________ 
 
3.  What is your ethnic or racial heritage?  
1) Black or African American 
2) White or Caucasian 
3) Latino/ Hispanic 
4) Native American 
5) Multiracial 
6) Other (please specify) _______________________________________________ 
 
4.   What is your current relationship status? (please choose one) 
1) Married or living with someone as if married 
2) Widowed 
3) Divorced or annulled 
4) Separated 
5) Never married 
 
5.  Do you have any children? Yes  No 
If yes, how many? _________ 
 
6.  Where do you live? (choose all that apply) 
1) With partner/spouse/significant other 
2) With parents 
3) With children 
4) With other relatives or friends 
5) Alone 
 
7.  Please estimate your yearly household income: 
 1) Less than $20,000 4) $60,000-$80,000 
 2) $20,000-$40,000 5) $80,000-$100,000 
 3) $40,000-60,000  6) More than $100,000 
 
8. What are your height (in inches) and weight (in pounds)?  If you are not completely certain of 
this information, please give us your closes approximation of each. 
  Height _________  
 Weight_________ 
 
9. How long have you had diabetes? 
Years _________   Months_________ 
 
10. What is your most recent HbA1c level?   _______ 
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Problem Areas In Diabetes (PAID) Questionnaire 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Which of the following diabetes issues are currently a problem for you? 
Circle the number that gives the best answer for you. Please provide an answer for each question. 
                                  Somewhat 
  Not            Minor                   Moderate       serious                Serious 
a problem             problem                   problem     problem                 problem 
0                 1                       2                                     3                   4 
 
1. Not having clear and concrete goals for your diabetes care?   __________ 
 
2. Feeling discouraged with your diabetes treatment  plan?  __________ 
 
3. Feeling scared when you think about living with diabetes?  ____________ 
 
4. Uncomfortable social situations related to your diabetes care (e.g., people telling you what to eat)?  ____ 
 
5. Feelings of deprivation regarding food and meals?   ___________ 
 
6. Feeling depressed when you think about living with diabetes?   ____________ 
 
7. Not knowing if your mood or feelings are related to your diabetes?  ____________ 
 
8. Feeling overwhelmed by your diabetes?   ______________ 
 
9. Worrying about low blood sugar reactions?   ______________ 
 
10. Feeling angry when you think about living with diabetes?  ______________ 
 
11. Feeling constantly concerned about food and eating?   _____________ 
 
12. Worrying about the future and the possibility of serious complications?   ___________ 
 
13. Feelings of guilt or anxiety when you get off track with your diabetes management? ____ 
 
14. Not "accepting" your diabetes?   ___________ 
 
15. Feeling unsatisfied with your diabetes physician?   ____________ 
 
16. Feeling that diabetes is taking up too much of your  mental and physical energy every day? _________ 
        
17. Feeling alone with your diabetes?   ____________ 
 
18. Feeling that your friends and family are not supportive of your diabetes management efforts?  _______ 
 
19. Coping with complications of diabetes?   ___________ 
 
20. Feeling "burned out" by the constant effort needed to manage diabetes?   ___________ 
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Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Information Measure 
Most people compare themselves from time to time with others.  For example, they may 
compare the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities, and/or their situation with those of other 
people.  There is nothing particularly “good” or “bad” about this type of comparison, and some 
people do it more than others.  We would like to find out how often you compare yourself with 
other people.  To do that we would like you to indicate how much you agree with each statement 
below, by using the following scale. 
 
A B C D E 
I disagree 
strongly 
   I agree strongly 
 
1.  I often compare how my loved ones (boy or girlfriend, family members, etc.) are doing with 
how others are doing. 
 
2.  I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things. 
 
3.  If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I have done with how 
others have done. 
 
4.  I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people. 
 
5.  I am not the type of person who compares often with others. (reversed) 
 
6.  I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life.  
 
7.  I often like to talk with others about mutual opinions and experiences. 
 
8.  I often try to find out what others think who face similar problems as I face. 
 
9.  I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do. 
 
10.  If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about it. 
 
11.  I never consider my situation in life relative to that of other people. (reversed) 
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A B C D E 
I disagree 
strongly 
   I agree strongly 
 
Upward comparison subscale 
 
1.  When it comes to my personal life, I sometimes compare myself with others who have it 
better than I do. 
 
2.  When I consider how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity), I prefer to compare 
with others who are more socially skilled than I am. 
 
3.  When evaluating my current performance (e.g., how I am doing at home, work, school, or 
wherever), I often compare with others who are doing better than I am. 
 
4.  When I wonder how good I am at something, I sometimes compare myself with others who 
are better at it than I am. 
 
5.  When things are going poorly, I think of others who have it better than I do. 
 
6.  I sometimes compare myself with others who have accomplished more in life than I have. 
 
 
Downward comparison subscale 
 
1.  When it comes to my personal life, I sometimes compare myself with others who have it 
worse than I do. 
 
2.  When I consider how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity), I prefer to compare 
with others who are less socially skilled than I am. 
 
3.  When evaluating my current performance (e.g., how I am doing at home, work, school, or 
wherever), I often compare with others who are doing worse than I am. 
 
4.  When I wonder how good I am at something, I sometimes compare myself with others who 
are worse at it than I am. 
 
5.  When things are going poorly, I think of others who have it worse than I do. 
 
6.  I sometimes compare myself with others who have accomplished less in life than I have. 
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Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
  
  Not at all           Slightly           Moderately              Very much              Extremely 
        1                2                   3                        4    5 
 
 
Are you a talkative person?     _______ 
Are you rather lively?  _______ 
Do you enjoy meeting new people?    ________ 
Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?    _______ 
Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends?   _______ 
Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?    _______ 
Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?   _______ 
Do you like mixing with people?   _______ 
Do you like to plenty of action and excitement around you?   _______ 
Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?   ________ 
Do other people think of you as being very lively?   ________ 
Can you get a party going?   _______  
Does your mood often go up and down?    _______ 
Do you ever feel miserable for no reason?   _______ 
Are you an irritable person?   _______ 
Are your feelings easily hurt?   _______ 
Do you often feel "fed-up"?   _______ 
Would you call yourself a nervous person?   _______ 
Are you a worrier?   _______ 
Would you call yourself tense or “highly-strung”?   _______ 
Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?   _______ 
Do you suffer from nerves?   _______ 
Do you often feel lonely?   _______ 
Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?   _______ 
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Pre- and Post-Selection Affect 
1. How do you feel right now?  
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Sleepy     Highly Active 
 
 
2. How do you feel right now?  
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Very Unpleasant    Very Pleasant 
 
 
3. How do you feel right now?  
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Depressed            Excited 
 
 
4. How do you feel right now?  
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Highly Stressed       Very Relaxed 
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Self-Ratings of Illness Severity and Coping 
 
 
 
1. How often do you experience symptoms of diabetes? 
 
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Rarely            Every day 
 
 
 
2. In general, how severe are your current symptoms?  
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Very mild            Very severe 
 
 
 
3. In general, how many diabetes symptoms do you currently experience? 
 
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Very few            Very many 
 
 
4. How much do your diabetes symptoms interfere with or restrict your daily activities? 
 
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Not at all            Very much 
 
 
5. How well are you coping with your current diabetes symptoms? 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Very well          Fairly well             Neutral                Not that well             Not well at all 
 (No problems)      (Manageable      (Some distress)       (A lot of distress)        (High distress)                         
                                     distress)         
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Motivations for Target Selection 
 
Please rate the extent to which each of these factors contributed to your decision to select this 
patient: 
 
     1                  2                      3                               4                             5 
Not at all           A little bit            Somewhat  Quite a bit        Very much 
 
 
 
1. To gain useful information about how to improve my situation. ____ 
 
2. To boost my confidence in my ability to manage diabetes symptoms.  ____ 
 
3. To feel better about my own situation. ____ 
 
4. To learn that others have experiences similar to my own. ____ 
 
5. To confirm that my situation is bad. ____ 
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Perceived Similarity 
 
1. While reading the description of the patient you chose, how much did you focus on 
differences between yourself and the patient? 
 
     1               2                      3                               4                             5 
Not at all        A little bit            Some of the time        Quite a bit   Most of the time 
 
 
2. While reading the description of the patient you chose, how much did you focus on 
similarities between yourself and the patient? 
     1               2                      3                               4                             5 
Not at all        A little bit            Some of the time        Quite a bit   Most of the time 
 
 
Motivation to Improve Self-Care 
 
1. How motivated are you to engage in your recommended self-care behaviors, such as watching 
your diet, exercising, and testing your blood sugar? 
 
     1               2                      3                               4                             5 
Not motivated       A little bit              Moderately   Highly      Very highly 
    at all            motivated               motivated motivated              motivated 
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Appendix B 
Target Selection (Participant Instructions) 
 
Now we would like you to read a short description of another patient with diabetes. Below, 
please indicate which type of patient you would like to read about. 
 
 
I would like to read about a patient who: 
 
 
 
• Has mild diabetes symptoms and is coping well. 
• Has severe diabetes symptoms and is coping well. 
• Has mild diabetes symptoms and is not coping well. 
• Has severe diabetes symptoms and is not coping well. 
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Patient Vignettes (Selection Targets) 
 
Upward Illness/Upward Coping Target (Mild symptoms, coping well) 
“My family doctor diagnosed diabetes and referred me to a specialist based on some tests he did 
a while back. Before that time I had never felt depressed, and I was really down after I got the 
diagnosis, but emotionally I’m doing much better now. The specialist said that I can control my 
diabetes through diet, exercise, and monitoring my blood sugar. He said that I don’t need to be 
on any special medication. Right now my A1C level is 6, and I haven’t experienced any major 
symptoms recently. I do get thirsty and dizzy sometimes. But I’ve learned a lot about diabetes 
since the diagnosis and I’m hardly ever that worried about it now. It doesn’t really get in the way 
of my life.”  
 
Downward Illness/Upward Coping Target (Severe symptoms, coping well) 
“My family doctor diagnosed diabetes and referred me to a specialist based on some tests he did 
a while back. Before that time I had never felt depressed, and I was really down after I got the 
diagnosis, but emotionally I’m doing much better now. The specialist said that I need to change 
my diet, start exercising, and monitor my blood sugar. It’s been hard for me to do all that, but 
I’ve kept a positive outlook. He also put me on medication that he says might help, but we’ll see. 
Right now my A1C level is 11. I get thirsty and dizzy sometimes, I am tired a lot, and my 
eyesight is getting worse. Plus I have an open sore on my foot for the last few months that won’t 
get better. But I’ve learned a lot about diabetes since the diagnosis and I’m hardly ever that 
worried about it now. It doesn’t really get in the way of my life."  
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Upward Illness/Downward Coping Target (Mild symptoms, not coping well) 
“My family doctor diagnosed diabetes and referred me to a specialist based on some tests he did 
a while back. Before that time I had never felt depressed, but I’ve been really down ever since I 
got the diagnosis. The specialist said that I can control my diabetes through diet, exercise, and 
monitoring my blood sugar. He said that I don’t need to be on any special medication. Right now 
my A1C level is 6, and I haven’t experienced any major symptoms recently. I get thirsty and 
dizzy sometimes, and I get really nervous and frustrated a lot. I cry more than I used to, and I 
worry about how diabetes will affect the rest of my life and my relationships.”  
 
Downward Illness/Downward Coping Target (Severe symptoms, not coping well) 
“My family doctor diagnosed diabetes and referred me to a specialist based on some tests he did 
a while back. Before that time I had never felt depressed, but I’ve been really down ever since I 
got the diagnosis. The specialist said that I need to change my diet, start exercising, and monitor 
my blood sugar. It’s been hard for me to try to do all that. He also put me on medication that he 
says might help, but we’ll see. Right now my A1C level is 11. I get thirsty and dizzy sometimes, 
I am tired a lot, and my eyesight is getting worse. Plus I have an open sore on my foot for the last 
few months that won’t get better. Because of all this I get really nervous and frustrated a lot. I 
cry more than I used to, and I really worry about how diabetes will affect the rest of my life and 
my relationships.”  
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